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PREFATORY NOTE
The Model Communicative Torts Act (the Act) represents an effort to
codify and unify the diverse sources of tort liability arising from commu-
nication. The Act defines communicative torts as those sources of liability
arising from communication including defamation, invasion of privacy,
appropriation, product disparagement, fraud, incitement, harassment, breach
of confidence, and other allied causes of action. The current law of
communicative torts represents a patchwork of common-law doctrines. The
rules of liability vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and subtle yet
often inconsistent distinctions exist within the evolving common-law doc-
trines. The doctrines of limitation and privilege stemming from the first
amendment add to the difficulties of interpretation and prediction. Beginning
with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), constitutional
limitations have required a restriking of the balance in many of the under-
lying torts, often fundamentally changing their character. While the consti-
tutional limitations have focused largely on the tort of defamation, concerns
about the application of constitutional limitations to the full range of
communicative torts are now prominent as challenges in the fields of
negligence, emotional distress, product disparagement, and fraud are taking
place.
The purpose of the Model Communicative Torts Act is threefold. First,
the Act attempts to consolidate the sources of tort liability to limit the
expansion of the various communicative torts and to clarify the underlying
policies reflected in each tort. Second, the Act attempts to strike a balance
within the torts themselves to reflect the needed attention to first amendment
concerns and at the same time to obviate the unsettling impact of consti-
tutional privileges that courts have superimposed upon existing sources of
tort liability. In other words, the Act incorporates first amendment concerns
directly into the definitions of the torts themselves and the remedial pro-
visions. Third, the Model Act establishes procedures and remedies that are
tailored to the interest that each tort seeks to protect and that reflect the
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realistic expectations of the parties. Thus, a central feature of the Act is
the set of provisions that limits available damages and encourages corrections
and retractions.
In these and other respects, the Act attempts to vindicate the legitimate
interests of those who have been wronged, to avoid duplicative and over-
lapping sources of liability, to establish a more straightforward procedural
system for adjudicating claims, and to protect individual and press interests





As used in this [Act]:
1. Communication means the intentional conveyance of information
to a person.
2. Customarily Confidential Relationship means a nonpersonal rela-
tionship between two persons in which professional, business, or
customary practice establishes an expectation that information re-
vealed during the course of the relationship will not be disclosed to
persons outside the relationship.
3. Imminent means impending and likely to occur before preventive
measures can be taken.
4. Improper Means means any method of acquiring confidential in-
formation, except (1) acquiring information as a direct consequence
of another person's breach of confidence; (2) acquiring information
as a result of another person's negligent maintenance of confidential
information; (3) acquiring information in accordance with an express
agreement to receive and hold the information in confidence; or (4)
acquiring information in the course of a customarily confidential
relationship.
5. Intimate Fact means a personal fact about an individual, publication
of which is reasonably within the control of the individual.
6. Lawless Conduct means conduct defined as a [felony] [serious
misdemeanor] under the laws of this State.
7. Likeness means any reasonably identifiable representation of an
individual.
8. Misleading means conveying a false impression of fact.
9. Misrepresentation means a communication, whether by statement,
act, or omission, that amounts to an assertion substantially at
variance with the truth.
10. Newsworthy means a matter of public concern. If not itself news-
worthy, a fact within a publication is newsworthy if it is integral
to a matter of public concern, such that the omission of the fact
would substantially mislead or confuse the public as to the matter
of public concern.
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11. Nonpersonal Relationship means a relationship that is substantially
based on business or professional ties.
12. Person means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, association, joint venture, governmental subdi-
vision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
13. Photograph means any photograph or photographic reproduction,
still or moving, or any videotape or live transmission, of any
individual, so that the individual is readily identifiable.
14. Publication means a communication to a person other than the
person claiming to be injured by the communication.
15. Public Record means any governmental information that is lawfully
open to general public inspection.
16. Reputation means the perception of a person reasonably held by
others in a community, as evidenced by the person's social, com-
mercial, professional, or political relationships within the commu-
nity.
Comment to Section 1-101
The definition of misrepresentation in subsection 1-101(9) is intended
to give courts wide latitude in applying the term. When deciding whether a
communication constitutes a misrepresentation, courts should place greater
emphasis on the substance of the communication at issue rather than on
form. Subsection 1-101(9) incorporates the definition of communication
contained in subsection 1-101(1). An "intentional conveyance of informa-
tion" may be any type of communication. A communication may be a
statement, act, or an omission to act.
Subsection 1-101(9) includes all false communications and avoids the
necessity of distinguishing fact from opinion. Instead, the subsection rec-
ognizes that courts have imposed liability on statements that fall under the
classic definition of opinion and also justifies the imposition of liability on
other grounds. See Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853,
856 (2d Cir. 1918) (stating, albeit in dicta, rule that person may be liable
for statements of opinion if recipient does not stand "on an equality").
Subsection 1-101(9) also includes some statements of judgment as mis-
representations. To be actionable as a misrepresentation, a communication
that refers to a judgment must be based on facts unknown to the recipient
and falsely must imply that the person making the communication knows
of facts that justify the judgment. A communication falsely implies a
person's knowledge if the communication implies that the person making
the communication knows of no facts inconsistent with the judgment or
knows of facts that sufficiently justify the judgment and the person knows
of no such facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 (1977) (dealing
with opinions that imply justifying facts). A judgment is based on facts
unknown to the recipient if the recipient reasonably believes that the person
possesses, or if the person actually possesses, greater knowledge or access
to information regarding the judgment and the recipient reasonably cannot
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acquire knowledge or information to render the person's judgment unreli-
able. See Mears v. Accomac Banking Co., 160 Va. 311, 168 S.E. 740
(1933); see also Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856
(2d Cir. 1918) (explaining that law should treat differently opinion between
chemist and layman and opinion between two chemists).
Article 2
Civil Liability in Tort Arising from Communication
Section 2-101. General Rule of Liability.
There shall be no liability in tort for injuries caused by communi-
cation except as provided in this [Act]; however, this [Act] shall
not affect:
(a) liability explicitly imposed notwithstanding this [Act] by a statute
or regulation of this State;
(b) liability for professional malpractice;
(c) liability for conduct that is related to or part of a communication
to the extent that liability would apply to the conduct absent the
communication;
(d) liability under the consumer protection laws of this State; and
(e) liability for copyright, trademark, or trade name infringement.
Comment to Section 2-101
Article 2 is the central provision of the Act. The Act's basic purpose
is to supplant existing and varied sources of tort liability based on com-
munication with a limited number of causes of action. Existing tort liability,
whether of common-law or statutory origin, is plagued with problems of
inconsistency, uncertainty, unknown potential for liability, and largely unex-
plored constitutional difficulties.
In light of the Act's overriding purpose of replacing existing law with
a more organized framework of tort liability, Section 2-101 provides that
actions in tort for injury based on or resulting from a communication must
be brought under the Act, with several stated exceptions. Section 2-101
supplants existing causes of action that arise from communication including
but not limited to libel, privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, fraudulent mis-
representation, product disparagement, trade libel, the right of publicity,
incitement, and breach of confidentiality. The Act does not affect causes
of action based on communication that are based on theories of liability
other than tort such as contract.
Section 2-101 contains five exceptions to the general rule that all
communicative tort liability must arise under the Act. Subsection 2-101(a)
provides that additional causes of action arising from communication are
not supplanted if they are created by a statute or regulation that expressly
authorizes the action notwithstanding the Act. Common-law, statutory, or
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regulatory liability, therefore, cannot survive the Act by default. To survive
the Act, the legislature specifically must provide that the statute or regulation
imposing tort liability based on communication is unaffected by the Act.
Subsection 2-101(b) provides that the Act does not supplant causes of
action for professional malpractice under the laws of a state. The Act
reflects the judgment that the interests served by liability for malpractice
and professional misconduct are sufficiently discreet and different from
those common to other forms of tort liability that they should be left
unaffected.
Subsection 2-101(c) provides that conduct-based causes of action in tort,
which may involve communication but in which liability is independent of
communication, should not be supplanted by the Act. Many communications
have potentially actionable conduct associated with them. For example, if
X paints a statement on Y's house without Y's permission, X has made a
communication and has damaged Y's property. X's liability for the com-
munication depends on the availability of relief under the Act. Even if
relief is not available under the Act, however, liability for the property
damage would remain available if provided by the laws of a state. In such
cases the Act forecloses liability for the communication but does not
extinguish liability for conduct accompanying a communication if the con-
duct, absent the communication, is actionable under the laws of a state.
Subsection 2-101(d) provides that the Act does not affect liability
pursuant to the consumer protection laws of a state. Many state consumer
protection laws are designed expressly to protect the public interest rather
than any individual's economic well-being. ALA. CODE § 8-19-2 (1984); W.
VA. CODE § 46A-6-101 (1988); Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331,
544 P.2d 88 (1976) (holding that purpose of Washington consumer protection
law is to protect public interest). Although consumer protection laws often
have the effect of protecting an individual's interests, the primary interest
protected by consumer protection laws is distinct from the interests identified
in the Act.
Subsection 2-101(e) provides that the Act does not affect liability
pursuant to state copyright or trademark law. Although most copyright and
trademark law is federal and, therefore, unaffected by the Act, the Act
does not supplant the small body of state copyright or trademark law.
Article 3
Harm to Reputation
Section 3-101. Liability for Injury to Reputation.
A person who publishes, or causes to be published, a false or misleading
communication that refers to another person and injures that person's
reputation is subject to liability to that person either in an action for
declaratory judgment pursuant to Section 9-107 or special damages pursuant
to Section 9-101.
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(a) In an action for declaratory judgment, injury to reputation is
presumed.
(b) A person seeking special damages must prove injury to reputation
by clear and convincing evidence.
Comment to Section 3-101
Article 3 provides a cause of action for protection of the interest in
reputation, both individual and corporate. Section 3-101 is the exclusive
basis upon which reputational interests can be vindicated in communicative
tort law (although other provisions of the Act protect related interests)
because the Act supplants the libel and slander torts as well as the action
for false light invasion of privacy.
Article 3 is intended to provide a clearer and more finely balanced
accommodation of both the plaintiff's and defendant's interests than cur-
rently exists. "Reputation" is defined as freedom from communications
that are false or misleading in factual terms, that are made to a third party,
that injure reputation, and that refer to the person injured.
Section 3-101 permits recovery for injurious communication that is false
or misleading. In both cases false fact must be established. See Section 1-
101(8). A misleading communication is one in which the communication on
its face may be true, but the circumstances or context in which the
communication is made creates a false impression of fact.
Section 3-101 maintains the distinction between fact and opinion, al-
though the Section does not require a court to make explicitly such a
distinction. Because only false communication or communication that be-
cause of its context conveys a false impression of fact is actionable,
communication that is opinion is protected. The "opinion" issue, therefore,
does not depend on a complex and abstract definition of opinion. The
"opinion" issue, rather, depends on a practical evidentiary determination
of whether the statement was understood as asserting fact or could not be
reasonably understood notwithstanding the statement's linguistic formula-
tion.
Current libel law does not sufficiently protect reputational interests. The
required showing of fault places a nearly insurmountable burden upon
injured persons who must intrude into a publisher's newsgathering proce-
dures to prove fault. The emphasis on fault permits recovery only by injured
persons who can prove fault and leaves injured persons who can prove only
falsity and injury without remedy. Moreover, the emphasis placed on the
status of the plaintiff in libel actions and the classification of plaintiffs as
"private persons," "public figures," and "public officials," with the atten-
dant increasing burden of proof of fault, limits the importance of reputa-
tional injury and shifts the focus of libel actions from reputational injury
to the status of the plaintiff.
Section 3-101 remedies these and other existing problems of libel law
and restrikes the balance between reputational interests and free speech
interests. A central element of the restruck balance is the remedy available
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to injured persons. A principal remedy is declaratory judgment. In an action
for declaratory judgment, the injured person is required only to prove that
the communication was false or misleading. Injury is presumed. A declar-
atory judgment will provide an expedient and inexpensive remedy by cor-
recting a false or misleading statement, thus serving the needs of most
injured persons who wish merely to clear their names.
Persons who have suffered pecuniary loss may seek special damages as
an alternative to a declaratory judgment. In an action for special damages,
an injured person must prove that the communication was false or mislead-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence. Injury to reputation is not pre-
sumed. An injured person specifically must plead and present evidence
showing the scope and severity of the injury and must prove injury to
reputation by clear and convincing evidence. The requirement that injured
persons prove reputational injury will diminish the likelihood of frivolous
suits and afford the press protection. Further, changing the focus of the
action from the fault of the publisher to the injury suffered and requiring
proof of injury before allowing compensation better comports with the
legitimate reputational interests that the injured party wants vindicated.
Finally, an injured person may request a retraction pursuant to Section
9-110. If the party who made the communication publishes a sufficient
retraction within 10 days of the allegedly injurious communication, the
retraction constitutes a complete defense to liability. The injured party then
is barred from any other relief applicable to the claim.
Article 3 also protects the defendant's interests. Because fault is not an
element of either the declaratory judgment or the special damage remedy,
a plaintiff is not required to intrude into the defendant's newsgathering
procedures. The declaratory judgment process is faster and less expensive
than the current litigation process. Plaintiffs are limited to a choice between
an action for declaratory judgment and an action for special damages.
Because special damages are limited to actual pecuniary loss, defendants no
longer need to fear excessive jury awards that do not accurately reflect the
plaintiff's reputational injury.
While Section 3-101, along with the declaratory judgment, special dam-
age, and retraction provisions of Article 9, strikes a different balance from
that reflected in current libel law, there is good reason to believe that it is
constitutional and meets the United States Supreme Court's concerns ex-
pressed in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its
progeny. In Sullivan the Supreme Court determined that public official
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the publisher knew that the defamatory
communication was false or published the statement in reckless disregard
of its truth or falsity. The Court's rationale for developing the actual malice
requirement lay in the chilling effect that large monetary awards could have
on the press and rested on a common-law libel tort that presumed falsity,
contained no substantial requirement that injury be proved, and left the
jury full discretion in awarding damages. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
Although a showing of actual malice is not required under Section 3-
101, other features of the reputation tort serve to strike a constitutional
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balance that meets the Court's concern in Sullivan. First, in an action for
special damages under Section 3-101, injury to reputation is not presumed.
To recover special damages, a plaintiff must plead and prove injury to
reputation by clear and convincing evidence. Second, a plaintiff must prove
that the statement was false or misleading by a preponderance of the
evidence. Third, damages available to successful plaintiffs are limited to
proven special damages. Fourth, although reputational damage is presumed
in an action for declaratory judgment, the presumption of reputational
damage is not absolute. Defendants may proffer evidence demonstrating
that a plaintiff's reputation was not injured. Permitting the defendant to
rebut the presumption of reputational injury will help to ensure that
plaintiffs will not be granted declaratory judgment if the plaintiffs have
sustained no reputational injury. Finally, the publisher may retract the
offending statement, and thus may avoid completely a cause of action or
limit damages if the retraction is issued in accordance with Section 9-110.
Requiring proof of reputational injury and limiting the available remedies
to declaratory judgment or special damages comports with the constitutional
concerns raised by Sullivan and its progeny.
It also is proper for corporations or other entities to bring suit under
this Section. A corporation suffers reputational injury if a false communi-
cation impugns the corporation's business practices or ethics generally,
causing others to stop doing business with that corporation. If a false
communication injures the corporation's commercial interest in a specific
product, the corporation has an action under Section 5-102 of this Act.
Section 3-102. Exceptions to Liability.
In addition to the privileges contained in Section 8-107, a publisher is
not liable under Section 3-101 if:
(a) the publisher is the individual's current or former employer who
publishes a communication concerning the work record or perform-
ance of the individual, reasonably believing the communication to
be true, and publishes the communication only:
(i) to a person requesting reference information as the indivi-
dual's current employer, prospective employer, or as an
educational institution to which the individual has made
application;
(ii) during labor arbitration or collective bargaining negotiation
for the individual's work place; or
(iii) at the request of a governmental official or agency officially
charged with acting in the public interest;
(b) the publisher is an educational institution that the individual has
attended or is attending and the institution publishes the commu-
nication, reasonably believing the communication to be true, and
publishes the communication only under circumstances provided in
subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ili); or
(c) the publication is a service letter pursuant to Section 3-103 and the
employee has not informed the employer of any inaccuracy in the
letter.
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Comment to Section 3-102
Section 3-102 defines specific circumstances in which a publisher is not
liable for communications harming an individual's reputation even if the
communication is false or misleading. The exception to liability is limited
narrowly to the employment setting, where a dramatic increase of frequently
nonmeritorious libel claims has arisen (often as a substitute theory of
recovery to wrongful discharge) and where society has an interest in the
free exchange of certain information even though it may contain inaccura-
cies. Under these circumstances, a publisher might consider even the limited
damages of Section 3-101 to be a prohibitive cost when compared to the
benefits of making the communication, therefore choosing not to provide
the information. Section 3-102 encourages the communications by removing
the threat of liability for good faith communications. The exception, or
privilege, in Section 3-102 applies only as long as the publisher reasonably
believes the communication's accuracy and only applies to claims of harm
to reputation.
Subsection 3-102(a) protects the release of information commonly known
as "references." Under the subsection employers are not liable for com-
municating about a current or former employee's work performance. This
protection also applies to the employer's agents acting within the scope of
their employment, and in this respect corresponds to the scope of the
existing common-law qualified privilege. Cashio v. Holt, 425 So. 2d 820
(La. Ct. App. 1982). Subsection (a), however, requires the employer to
establish a reasonable belief in the information. In contrast, at common
law the plaintiff bore the burden of proof and had to show an abuse of
privilege by proving malice. Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 657
P.2d 101 (1983).
Subsection 3-102(a) limits the employer's protection further by specifying
only three circumstances in which liability is excluded. Subsection 3-102(a)(i)
protects an employer's communication only if the employer is responding
to a request for information from the individual's current employer, to
someone interested in hiring the individual, or to a school to which the
individual has applied for admission. The common-law privilege applied
more broadly to any communication between employers having a common
legitimate interest regardless of who initiated the exchange. Fisk v. War-
mack, 486 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1986). Protecting only communications
resulting from a request for information eliminates the need to inquire into
the publisher's motives for making the communication.
Subsection 3-102(a)(ii) protects an employer's statements made in the
context of collective bargaining negotiations and labor disputes if the
employer reasonably believes the information. This approach departs from
the common-law rule, which treated labor negotiations as the equivalent of
official proceedings, with the result that the employer's statements were
entitled to an absolute privilege. Sturdivant v. Seaboard Service Systems,
Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1983). The change is intended to protect the
employee who often has to depend on his union or others to represent his
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rights without any ability to respond to the employer's comments. Under
subsection (a)(ii) the employer may reveal information without a request
from a third party in order to provide the parties access to information
that is relevant to an informed resolution of the proceedings.
Subsection 3-102(a)(iii) deals with lawful requests from public agencies
and officials. Society heavily regulates the work place, and subsection (a)(iii)
is drawn broadly so that an employer reasonably can reply to requests from
any possible governmental unit or official. The employer reasonably must
believe that the requesting agency or official is acting within its authority.
Subsection 3-102(b) protects the release of information by educational
institutions, but applies only to requests from current or prospective em-
ployers or governmental units. Under those circumstances the communica-
tions represent the same interest as the employer's statements covered in
subsection (a).
Subsection 3-102(c) protects the employer's service statements made at
the request of the employee. Under Section 3-103 an employer must make
certain work record information available to the employee. The employer
is not liable for harm arising out of the employee's release of the information
to other persons if the employer reasonably believed the statement to be
true and the employer has not been notified of any errors.
Section 3-103. Statement of Service.
A compensated employee who has worked for an employer in this State
for at least ninety days shall be entitled to a statement of service from the
employer when the employment ends. The employee must request the
statement by registered mail within sixty days of the end of the employment.
The employer or an agent authorized by the employer then shall have forty-
five days to issue a letter to the employee signed by the employer or the
agent that states the duration of the employment, the positions the employee
held during the time, a brief description of the type and nature of work
the employee performed, and the true cause of the termination of employ-
ment.
Comment to Section 3-103
Section 3-103 provides a former employer with written information that
the employee may need in the future. Few states require an employer to
provide employees with job records. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.140 (Vernon
Supp. 1988). Section 3-103 gives the employee the right to have a statement
of the employee's work record if the employee has worked for the requisite
period of time and makes a timely request. Providing such a statement may
limit the number of records an employer chooses to keep and provides a
safe harbor for future disclosures by the employer. Section 3-103 requires
the employer to state the reasons the employee left the job but does not
interfere with the employer's right to discharge an employee at will. Brown
v. Southland Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Mo. 1985). The letter does not
represent an opinion of the employer or prevent the employer from making
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future references about an employee if the employer chooses to do so.
Article 4
Invasiveness
Section 4-101. Publication of Intimate Facts.
A person who unreasonably publishes an intimate fact about an indi-
vidual is subject to liability to the individual if that individual has acted in
a manner consistent with his or her intent to maintain control over the fact,
unless:
(a) the fact is contained in a public record of a legislative proceeding
or a judicial proceeding to which the government is a party;
(b) the fact is contained in a public record other than that described
in (a) and is newsworthy;
(c) the interest in the publication of a newsworthy intimate fact sub-
stantially outweighs the interest in preserving the individual's control
of the intimate fact; or
(d) the publication is otherwise privileged under Section 8-107.
Comment to Section 4-101
Protected Interests. Section 4-101 has as its major purpose protection
of an individual's identity and psychological stability. See Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890). The
fostering of self-identity and psychological stability requires that an individ-
ual have control over certain intimate facts about the individual. Unau-
thorized disclosure of intimate facts about an individual results in the loss
of control of those facts and emotional harm to the individual. Therefore,
the control of intimate facts is an essential concept of this Article.
Individuals, however, often voluntarily disclose intimate facts because
disclosure to family members and friends under certain circumstances also
is necessary to self-identity. Likewise, involuntary disclosures often are
necessary to the functioning of a well-ordered society and may not result
in complete loss of control over the facts. In order to strike a balance
between individual control and the equally important need for disclosure,
Section 4-101 only limits disclosure of intimate facts beyond the persons or
social unit in which the disclosure is reasonable.
Changes from Previous Law. The invasiveness tort established in Section
4-101 is derived from previous privacy law, namely, the tort of public
disclosure of private facts. Under the common law, attempts to strike a
proper balance between an individual's right to privacy and the public's
right to know proved difficult. See Woito and McNulty, The Privacy
Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide
Newsworthiness?, 64 IowA L. REv. 185, 197 (1979). While most jurisdictions
recognized a claim for public disclosure of private facts, courts have been
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reluctant to hold that a right to remain free from offensive publicity of
private facts overrode the press' right to inform and the public's right to
know. See Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. Riv. 291, 293 (1983).
To establish a prima facie case under the public disclosure tort, a
plaintiff has to prove the publicity of private facts that were highly offensive
to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the public. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The traditional protected
interest under the public disclosure tort was reputation and freedom from
emotional harm. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
Commentators also found, however, that the public disclosure tort protected
the dignity and integrity of the individual. See Bloustein, Privacy-An
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
962, 978 (1964). The Act severs the reputational interest (see Article 3) from
the public disclosure tort and redefines the dignity and integrity interests to
include the fostering of self-identity and psychological stability through the
control of intimate facts about oneself.
The traditional public disclosure tort required that the private fact be
publicized. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977); see
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc. 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978). In contrast, the tort
of invasiveness has no broad publicity requirement. Instead, the invasiveness
tort requires only that the intimate fact be communicated to a third party.
This change was made because loss of control and resulting harm to self-
identity may occur even in disclosure to a single person or small group.
Notwithstanding the elimination of the publicity element, however, the
invasiveness tort does incorporate a form of offensiveness inquiry in the
method of determination of an intimate fact. If a fact is deemed intimate
under the invasiveness tort, then the disclosure of the intimate fact is by
definition offensive (see subsection 1-101(5)).
Maintaining Control over the Fact. While the disclosure of an intimate
fact may be invasive, the disclosure may not be worthy of protection if the
individual has not tried to keep the disclosed fact private. To maintain a
cause of action under Section 4-101, an individual must have acted consis-
tently with an intent to maintain control over the disclosed fact prior to
publication. For example, silence ordinarily would demonstrate behavior
that is consistent with an intent to maintain control over an intimate fact.
Likewise, an individual who writes intimate facts in a diary and keeps the
diary in a bedside table has acted consistently with the intent to maintain
control over the intimate facts contained in the diary. On the other hand,
leaving the diary in the plain view of others, intentionally or negligently,
may be inconsistent with an intent to maintain control over the intimate
facts in the diary. Likewise, someone engaged in an extramarital affair who
flaunts that fact to the public is not acting consistently with an intent to
keep the fact of the affair private.
An individual may act consistently with his or her intent to control
facts even in an involuntary disclosure. An involuntary disclosure is one in
which an individual is compelled to disclose certain facts about him or
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herself to another person, often to a governmental entity (e.g., filing a tax
return). Compelled disclosure will not negate an otherwise sufficient showing
of an intent to maintain control over intimate facts. Similarly, disclosure
of intimate facts to family members or intimate friends does not necessarily
demonstrate inconsistent behavior. An individual may still maintain a cause
of action against a friend to whom the individual has disclosed intimate
facts if the friend unreasonably discloses the intimate facts to a stranger or
the media.
The analysis used to determine whether behavior is consistent with an
intent to maintain control over intimate facts about himself or herself is
analogous to the assessment of an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the criminal law context under the fourth amendment. What an
individual seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. For example, in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the words the individual
utters in a public telephone booth. Although the telephone booth itself was
public, the Supreme Court reasoned in Katz that the user still had a
reasonable expectation that the conversation was private. Section 4-101
adopts this form of analysis in that an individual acts consistently with an
intent to maintain control over an intimate fact if the individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the intimate fact.
Determining Intimate Fact. For a cause of action to exist under this
Section, an initial determination must be made as to whether the fact is an
intimate fact as defined in subsection 1-101(5). The trier of fact is to apply
a standard of reasonableness to determine whether the publication of a
personal fact ordinarily is considered to lie within the control of the
individual. If the trier of fact finds that a personal fact is reasonably within
the control of the individual (the plaintiff), then the fact is an intimate fact
as defined in this Section. The plaintiff and the defendant may offer extrinsic
evidence as to whether the fact reasonably can be considered to lie within
the control of the individual.
Reasonable Publication. While the manner of disclosure of the fact or
any other circumstance concerning the fact is not relevant to the determi-
nation of whether the fact is intimate, the determination of whether an
individual has lost a claim to control over the fact depends on the circum-
stances of any publication, as well as the plaintiff's conduct with respect
to the fact. Section 4-101 requires that the publication be unreasonable.
The unreasonable publication requirement ensures that publications of in-
timate facts that are necessary or beneficial are not actionable under the
Section. An unreasonable publication is a publication that results in a
significant loss of control over an intimate fact. The significance of an
individual's loss of control is measured by the persons to whom the
publication is made. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of a related interest in control over information in the privacy
setting. See United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989). Supporting the unreasonable disclosure
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requirement is the recognition that disclosure among family or friends is
just as necessary to developing an individual's self-identity as the need to
control intimate facts in relation to broader disclosures. However, a disclo-
sure to a person outside an individual's circle of family and friends may
be unreasonable because it represents a more significant loss of control over
the information. For example, if an individual disclosed private facts to a
close friend and that friend in turn told a newspaper the intimate fact, then
that disclosure would be unreasonable. In addition, any disclosure of that
information by the newspaper also would be unreasonable, subject to any
applicable privileges.
Public Records. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), the Supreme Court recognized that an individual's right to privacy
is outweighed by the public benefit performed by the press reporting the
operations of government through the use of public records. However, the
Cox Court narrowed its holding only to public records that are maintained
in connection with a public prosecution and are open to public inspection.
Accordingly, Section 4-101 protects information found in two types of
public records (as defined in Section 1-101). First, publication of information
in the Cox type of public record or a record of a legislative proceeding
described in subsection 4-101(a) is not actionable. Second, publication of
information in any other public record described in subsection 4-101(b) is
actionable to the extent that the intimate fact is not newsworthy and to the
extent that other privileges found in Section 8-107 are not applicable.
First amendment interests are protected adequately by affording com-
plete protection from liability if a fact is contained in a public record of a
legislative proceeding or a judicial proceeding in which the government is a
party and by balancing first amendment interests with the individual's right
to control private information about him or herself in other types of public
records. Even though privacy interests fade when information appears in a
public record, those interests should not disappear completely, as the fact
of inclusion in a public record, standing alone, does not necessarily result
in the loss of control of the information because public records are not
always readily accessible.
The public record exception applies to any information contained in a
public record regardless of where the publisher obtained the information.
For example, if a publisher obtained information from a source but later
found that the information was part of a public record at the time of
disclosure, then the public record defense applies. However, information
that becomes part of a public record after disclosure does not affect liability
for prior publication.
The fair and accurate report privilege in Section 8-107 directly affects
the public record exception under Section 4-101. Under the fair and accurate
report privilege, there is no liability for a communication if the communi-
cation is part of a report of a legislative or judicial proceeding and the
report is fair and accurate. The fair and accurate report privilege under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that the publication be a report of
"an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that
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deals with a matter of public concern" and that the report is "accurate
and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported." RESTATE-
hIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977). The fair and accurate report privilege
under the Act rejects the Restatement's requirement that the proceeding
deal with a matter of public concern. Instead, the Act recognizes judicial
and legislative proceedings as newsworthy per se, at least to the extent that
they are covered by the fair and accurate report privilege.
Because legislative proceedings and judicial proceedings to which the
government is a party as well as newsworthy facts in a public record are
already nonactionable under subsections 4-101(a) and (b), the fair and
accurate report privilege affects most directly the case of nonnewsworthy
intimate facts in a judicial proceeding to which the government is not a
party (generally civil actions). In these cases, the publication of intimate
facts is privileged to the extent that the publication is fair and accurate.*
Newsworthiness. At common law, newsworthiness constituted a defense
to the public disclosure of private facts tort. The newsworthiness defense
afforded protection to the public's right to be informed on matters of
legitimate public concern. The scope of newsworthiness depended in part
on the status of the plaintiff as well as the subject matter of the publication.
See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117,
* After the drafting of the Act was complete, the United States Supreme court addressed
many of this Article's issues in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989). In Florida
Star the Supreme Court confronted a Florida state statute prohibiting the printing, publishing,
or broadcasting by mass communication of the name of a sexual offense victim. The Florida
Star, a city-wide newspaper, published a rape victim's name in violation of the Florida statute
after the newspaper lawfully obtained the victim's name in the press room of the Sheriff's
office. The Supreme Court held that imposing damages on The Florida Star for publishing
the victim's name violated the first amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish a publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)). The Supreme Court noted further
that the holding in Florida Star was limited. The Florida Star Court expressly stated that
truthful publication is not automatically constitutionally protected nor was the Court holding
that there is "no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual
from intrusion by the press." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613.
In declining to rule out the possibility of recovery in a lawsuit based on the public
disclosure tort, the Florida Star Court observed that the state interests in that case were
"highly significant." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's recovery
was barred because the state's tort system for such cases was not "narrowly tailored." Id. at
2613. Article 4 of the Act proposes a newly defined cause of action that likely meets the
Court's requirements. The protected interest is the fostering and preservation of self-identity
and psychological stability through the control of intimate facts about oneself. The action for
"invasive" publication may be considered a "narrowly tailored means of safeguarding ano-
nymity," id. at 2611, in its refinement of the public disclosure tort's prima facie case, in the
public domain privileges of subsections 4-101(a) and (b), and in its recalibration of available
damages under subsections 4-102(a) and (b). Thus, this Article supplies an "interest of the
highest order" as required by Florida Star. Furthermore, the express language used by the
majority in Florida Star that the Court still is prepared to protect a "zone of personal privacy"
leads to the conclusion that this Article meets the Florida Star's constitutional test.
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at 859 (5th ed. 1984). Comments on the lives of public officials and figures
were subject to the newsworthiness defense because these individuals by
virtue of their public status invited public criticism and comment. Section
4-101 rejects the public/private figure dichotomy. If the disclosed fact is
intimate and the other elements of the tort are met, then private as well as
public figures may recover.
The newsworthiness standard (as defined in subsection 1-101(10)) serves
two purposes. First, it bars a cause of action with regard to newsworthy
facts that are in a public record, described in subsection 4-101(b). News-
worthiness serves as an absolute defense in this limited category of facts,
and the burden is on the defendant to prove that the subject matter or
thrust of a publication is newsworthy. The newsworthiness defense is nec-
essary because information found in a public record is generally of legitimate
public concern and should be published. However, facts have different levels
of news value. Section 4-101 permits recovery for some intimate and
nonnewsworthy facts even though they are found in a public record. For
example, disclosure of an individual's name and disclosure of an individual
taking certain medication or suffering from an embarrassing disease may
not be newsworthy.
Second, under Section 4-102 newsworthiness limits the availability of
actual and emotional damages in cases of intimate facts that are not a part
of any public record to the value of the published facts in an arm's-length
transaction. Section 4-102 is intended to limit the "chilling effect" of large
damage awards on the press because Section 4-102 simply requires the press
to pay for information in the same manner in which the press would pay
for an interview.
Newsworthiness is determined by whether the subject matter or thrust
of a publication is a matter of public concern. A matter of public concern
includes information necessary to keep the public well-informed on signifi-
cant and legitimate issues of the day. Information that is in the public
interest should be distinguished from information in which the public is
interested. The latter does not necessarily constitute a matter of public
concern.
A particular fact in a publication, by itself, may be a matter of public
concern and thus newsworthy. However, if a fact is not by itself a matter
of public concern, to be deemed newsworthy the fact must be integral to
the subject matter or thrust of the publication (which itself must be
newsworthy as defined in subsection 1-101(10)). The test to determine if the
fact is integral is whether the omission of the fact would mislead substantially
or confuse the public as to the remaining facts in the publication or the
matter of public concern. If the information publicized will be substantially
incomplete, inhibiting the public from becoming duly informed, the omitted
fact is integral to the publication and thus is newsworthy. For example,
mentioning a patient's name and identifying the patient as a victim of an
unauthorized sterilization operation in an article about psychiatric hospitals
is not newsworthy because omission of the patient's name would not mislead,
confuse, or inhibit the public from becoming duly informed of the poor
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treatment patients receive in psychiatric hospitals. However, if the subject
matter of the publication was the patient, omission of the patient's name
would distort the article and confuse the public. See Howard v. Des Moines
Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 304 (1979) (holding that publi-
cation of plaintiff's involuntary sterilization in article on patient abuse was
newsworthy under common-law analysis). Similarly, if the article about the
patient is published in a sidebar (a separate article but subordinate to the
main story), the facts would not be newsworthy unless, standing alone, the
facts are a matter of public concern or, if viewed in connection with the
main story (which must be newsworthy itself), the facts are integral to the
subject matter or thrust of the main story.
Balancing of Interests. Subsection 4-101(c) sets forth a balancing test
that privileges publication of certain intimate facts that are "supernews-
worthy". The public interest in the publication of a newsworthy intimate
fact may outweigh substantially, in certain limited circumstances, the public's
and the individual's interest in preserving an individual's control of intimate
facts and, therefore, the publication should not be actionable under sub-
section 4-101. The limited circumstances contemplated under Section 4-
101(c) include, for example, the publication of those intimate facts about
individuals who hold public office (e.g., politicians and governmental offi-
cers) that may affect that individual's fitness for office. In determining
whether the public's interest substantially outweighs the individual's interest,
the trier of fact should consider the nexus between behavior (the publicized
intimate fact) and the individual's fitness for office.
For example, if a newspaper discovered and published that the President
of the United States is an alcoholic, the newspaper would be subject to
liability under Section 4-101 if the President had made every effort to
conceal the intimate fact and the intimate fact was not in a public record.
Absent the privilege, the fact that the President's drinking problem may be
newsworthy would not preclude the President from bringing an action, but
only would limit recoverable damages. In applying the subsection 4-101(c)
balancing test, however, the fact that the President is an alcoholic would
affect the fitness of the President to hold office and, therefore, it would
be in the public interest to disclose that information. The public interest in
the publication of this newsworthy intimate fact would outweigh substan-
tially any interest in preserving the President's control over the fact that
the President is an alcoholic. Therefore, the President would be precluded
from bringing a cause of action under Section 4-101.
Section 4-102. Remedies for Publication of Intimate Facts.
(a) Recovery of special damages is permitted pursuant to Section 9-101
and for resulting emotional harm pursuant to Section 9-102 unless
the fact is newsworthy, in which case recovery is limited to the
lesser of:
(i) damages under Sections 9-101 and 9-102, or
(ii) the value of the fact in an arm's-length transaction.
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(b) Recovery of punitive damages is permitted pursuant to Section 9-
105 if the communication of the fact was the result of an intentional
violation of the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Recovery of punitive damages is limited to $100,000.
(c) Injunctive relief is available pursuant to Section 9-108 only to
prevent the publication of a fact that is not a part of any public
record and is not newsworthy.
Comment to Section 4-102
Remedies. Special damages and damages for resulting emotional harm,
pursuant to Sections 9-101 and 9-102, are generally available in invasiveness
actions. If the intimate fact is newsworthy, however, damages are limited
to the lesser of the sum of special and emotional damages or the value of
the fact in an arm's-length transaction. The lesser of the two forms of
damage is required in newsworthy cases because the forms of damage may
vary in relation to each other depending on the particular case. For example,
in the case of a prominent politician, the value of a fact in an arm's-length
transaction may exceed significantly any emotional and special damages. If
the transactional value exceeds the emotional and special damages, then the
individual would recover only special and emotional damages. Likewise, an
individual who is not in the public eye is subject to the same calculation
and would be limited to the lesser of either special and emotional damages
or transactional value.
Violations resulting from special circumstances. This provision deters
conduct that not only violates privacy through physical trespass but also
violates one's reasonable expectation of privacy through the using of more
subtle methods, such as using vision or hearing enhancers. Violations of
this kind coincide with the broader policy of Section 4-101 that protects an
individual's control of intimate facts about him or herself, the loss of which
results in emotional harm. Subsection 4-102(b) specifically recognizes pub-
lications that are the result of intentional conduct that violates a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Invasive intrusions, such as physical
trespassing and eavesdropping with electronic equipment, are examples of
conduct that were actionable under the common-law tort of intrusion. W.
PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117, at 854
(5th ed. 1984). Behavior that would constitute an intrusion and that results
in an invasive publication is accounted for in the damages calculation in
Section 4-102. Recovery of punitive damages is limited under this Section
in recognition of the potential "chilling effect" exorbitant damages may
have on the dissemination of information.
Injunctions. Subsection 4-102(c) permits injunctive relief, which is par-
ticularly appropriate in the invasiveness context. Harm caused by disclosure
of intimate facts is truly irreparable because the truth of the matter disclosed
precludes correction or retraction and the individual already has suffered
loss of control and emotional damage. The loss of public information as a
result of an injunction is substantially less in the invasiveness tort context
19901
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
than in the common-law defamation setting because the remedy generally
involves purging only identifying detail or information.
Article 5
Injury to Commercial Interests
Section 5-101. Usurpation of Control of Commercial Use of an Individual's
Identity.
(a) Liability for Usurpation.
(i) Any person who knowingly uses for commercial purposes
an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness, in any medium, in any manner, is subject to liability
to the individual or a transferee under Section 5-101(b) in
an action for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 9-108 and
special damages pursuant to Section 9-101.
(ii) A person bringing an action under this Section need not
allege or prove that the name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness previously was used for commercial purposes.
(ill) Commercial purposes means the use of a name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness with the primary purpose
of selling a product or service to the public for profit, but
does not include:
A. sale of the use itself; or
B. use as part of a history, textbook, film, or work of
entertainment, as long as the use is clearly related to a
bona fide historical, educational, or artistic purpose.
(b) Transferability of right.
(i) The right to control the commercial use of an individual's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness may be
assigned, licensed, or transferred by will.
(ii) Any assignment or license must:
A. be in writing,
B. specify the scope and duration of the assignment or
license, and
C. be signed by the transferor.
(c) Exclusivity and duration of right. The rights provided for in this
Section shall be deemed exclusive to the individual, subject to
transfer, for a period of twenty years after the death of the
individual.
(d) Newsworthy publication of an individual's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness is not actionable unless the publication:
(i) captures the entirety of the individual's commercial identity,
and
(i) poses a substantial threat to the economic value of the
individual's commercial identity.
(e) No individual member of a definable group may recover solely on
the basis of the defendant's use of a photograph of the definable
group.
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Comment to Section 5-101
Section 5-101 attempts to disentangle the law surrounding actions that
protect an individual's control over the commercial use of his or her identity.
The decision in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), which established that an individual has a legally
cognizable commercial interest in his or her identity, prompted much aca-
demic commentary and diverse judicial and legislative reaction. Soon after
Haelan, two courts responded differently to the new right to control the
use of one's own identity. In Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167
F.Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958), the court refused to "blaze the trail" to
establish a right of publicity. The court in Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co.,
114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. Tr. Ct. 1957), however, protected the plaintiff's
right to control the commercial use of his identity, indicating that 'right
of publicity' is as apt a label as any other."
State legislatures developed various remedies for the individual's com-
mercial loss arising out of the unauthorized use of identity. Virginia law
protects an individual's name and likeness against commercial usurpation
up to twenty years following the individual's death. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
40 (1987). Florida's right of publicity statute covers an individual's name,
portrait, photograph or other likeness for forty years after death. FLA.
STAT. § 540.08 (1988). In addition to name, photograph, and likeness, a
California statute protects signature and voice-all for a period of fifty
years following the individual's death. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (1988).
Section 5-101 protects an individual's interest in controlling the com-
mercial use of his or her own identity and serves three underlying policies.
First, Section 5-101 provides an economic incentive to individuals to
develop their own identity. The right to control the commercial use of one's
identity encourages individuals to invest time and effort toward personal
development. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
573 (1977).
Second, Section 5-101 protects individual autonomy by allowing an
individual to decide whether to exploit his or her image for trade purposes.
Without such protection, personal identities fall within the realm of "public
domain," rendering the individual powerless to control the use of the
personal aspects of his or her identity. See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law:
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331
(1966); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 989 (1964).
Third, Section 5-101 prevents unjust enrichment by any person not
authorized to use another's identity. Allowing a person to benefit from the
unauthorized use of an individual's identity rewards the usurper at the
expense of the creative efforts of the individual. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
Section 5-101 states the cause of action for usurpation of control of
the commercial use of an individual's identity, an action with its roots in
causes of action for infringement of the right of publicity and certain species
of unfair competition.
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Throughout the development of the right of publicity, various courts
and legislatures, have protected different aspects of an individual's identity.
Martin Luther King Jr. Center v. American Heritage Products, 250 Ga.
135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1982). See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (D.N.J. 1981); Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In addition to "name,
voice, signature, and photograph," subsection 5-101(a) protects an indivi-
dual's "likeness." Subsection 1-101(7) defines "likeness" as any reasonably
identifiable representation of an individual. Identifiability may be established
by demonstrating that a significant number of persons can recognize the
individual in the context of the use in question. Whether a voice imperson-
ation constitutes a reasonably identifiable representation of an individual
sufficient to comprise a "likeness" depends upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding the impersonation. Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to include voice impersonation as either "voice"
or "likeness" under California right of publicity statute).
Subsection 5-101(a)(i) makes available as remedies injunctive relief or
special damages. Special damages are determined by the fair market value
of the usurped aspect of identity. Proof of fair market value may include
but is not limited to the individual's previous remuneration in similar
commercial settings or amounts received by comparable individuals in similar
situations.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show a likelihood
of prevailing on the merits and that irreparable harm otherwise will result
from the defendant's usurpation of control over the commercial use of the
plaintiff's identity. The court may consider: (1) the effect of a preliminary
injunction on any third parties, (2) the balance of hardships between the
parties, and (3) the public' interest. To prevent continuing infringement
following a trial on the merits, the court may enjoin permanently the
defendant's commercial use of the plaintiff's identity, but only if the court
determines that special damages alone inadequately compensate the plaintiff.
Subsection 5-101(a)(ii) rejects the rule that an individual must commer-
cially exploit his or her identity to establish the existence of a cognizable
right. Some commentators reason that, without commercial exploitation, an
individual fails to develop or demonstrate the commercial existence of his
identity. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 n.78 (1979). Other authors
note that a commercial exploitation requirement strikes at the "common-
law preference for the survival of commercially valuable goodwill-type
assets." Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 453, 476 (1981); see also Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Com-
mercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAD. L.
REv. 1199, 1235 (1986) (characterizing lifetime exploitation as irrelevant).
No jurisdiction currently requires commercial exploitation of identity as a
condition precedent to an individual's establishing his or her right of control
over the commercial use of his or her identity. J. McCarthy, The Rights
of Publicity and Privacy 9-26 (1989).
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A commercial exploitation requirement discriminates against noncele-
brities and those individuals who choose not to use their identities com-
mercially. Subsection 5-101(a)(ii) reflects a policy decision against usurpation
of identity and in favor of individual autonomy over the use of an identity.
Subsection 5-101(a)(iii) defines "commercial purposes," emphasizing that
the usurper must appropriate the individual's identity for profit. Excluding
nonprofit activity reflects a policy of preventing the usurper's actual unjust
enrichment. Unauthorized use of an individual's identity without the primary
purpose of profitmaking does not enrich the usurper at the expense of the
individual. Whether usurpation reflects a "primary purpose" of profitmak-
ing depends upon the factfinder's evaluation of the subjective intent of the
usurper.
Subsection 5-101(b) states the general rule that permits an individual to
transfer his right to control the commercial use of his identity. Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.
1953). Any subsequent holder of the right may assert or transfer the right
consonant with the right's scope and duration. Subsection 5-101(b)(i) spe-
cifically mentions transfer by will, thereby eliminating intestate succession
under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Subsection 5-101(c) provides a fixed post mortem duration for the right
of control. Jurisdictions have enacted various post mortem duration periods
that extend from ten to fifty years. Federal law protects copyrights for fifty
years beyond the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1987). The twenty
year post mortem duration stated in subsection 5-101(c) reflects the under-
standing that, although the law should safeguard one's control over identity,
this control "has less social utility than the creative values protected by
copyright law." Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hur-
ricane", 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 977, 1009-12 (1982). Regardless of who holds the
right of publicity, the individual's identity enters the public domain twenty
years following the individual's death. If the individual transferred the right
pursuant to subsection 5-101(b), the transferee holds the right in accordance
with the transfer but in no case for more than twenty years following the
individual's death. If the transfer expires prior to the individual's date of
death plus twenty years, then control of the right reverts as the applicable
assignment, license, or will directs.
Subsection 5-101(d) reflects the holding of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Informative speech such as news
articles, documentaries, and scholarly analyses typically receives broad first
amendment protection. But, when publication captures the entirety of an
individual's commercial identity and imperils the individual's livelihood, the
individual's right to control the commercial value of his identity outweighs
the society's interest in free speech.
To establish that the publication captures the "entirety of the indivi-
dual's commercial identity," the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the
defendant appropriated the entire product of the plaintiff's own talents,
energy, time, effort, and expense, and (2) that the defendant's appropriation
precluded the plaintiff from reaping the reward of the plaintiff's endeavors.
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To prove that the publication poses "a substantial threat to the economic
value of the individual's commercial identity," the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's appropriation: (1) severely devalued the plaintiff's commer-
cial identity, and (2) struck at the core of the plaintiff's means of earning
a living.
For the purposes of subsection 5-101(e), "definable group" means any
public assemblage of individuals. Subsection (e) attempts to prevent a
plaintiff's recovery based on the defendant's use of photographs of the
plaintiff's appearance in crowd scenes in public places. This subsection does
not protect a defendant who singles out an individual in a crowd, such as
through enlargement, highlighting, emphasizing, or identifying by name.
Section 5-102. Product Disparagement.
(a) A person who publishes, or causes to be published, a false and
disparaging communication that refers to and injures the commercial
value of a product or service shall be subject to liability to the
owner, assignee, licensee, dealer, or seller of the product or service
either in an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Section 9-
107, or for special damages pursuant to Section 9-101.
(b) In an action for damages:
(i) The injured person shall bear the burden of proof of all
elements by clear and convincing evidence.
(ii) Recovery of punitive damages is permitted pursuant to
Section 9-105 if the injured person shows that the person
who published, or caused to be published, the false com-
munication did so with knowledge of, or reckless disregard
for, the communication's falsity.
(c) In an action for declaratory judgment, injury to commercial value
is presumed.
Comment to Section 5-102
Corporations have two types of interests that this Act protects. If a
false communication disparages the quality of a product or a service, a
corporation that provides the product or service may bring suit under
Section 5-102. If a false communication attacks the character of the business
by suggesting that the business engages in dishonest or misleading practices,
careless or dangerous manufacturing, or other activity, the disclosure of
which is detrimental to the business' reputation, the business has a cause
of action under Section 3-101. Nothing in this Section precludes a business
from bringing causes of action under both Sections 3-101 and 5-102 based
upon one communication.
The common law imposed liability for product disparagement where a
plaintiff proved that the defendant intentionally published a false and
disparaging statement about the plaintiff's product and caused the plaintiff
pecuniary loss. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977). A
common-law disparagement action required that the plaintiff prove that the
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defendant had one of the following three types of intent: (1) knowledge or
reckless disregard of the statement's falsity, (2) ill will, or (3) intent to harm
the plaintiff's business. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 623A comment
(d) (1977).
Section 5-102 removes any intent element from a disparagement action.
The gravamen of the injury under Section 5-102 is the false, disparaging
statement and its resultant harm, not the knowledge or intent of the
publisher of the statement. With the limitations on damages and the
availability of retraction provided in the Act, a requirement of intent was
not deemed necessary. Current constitutional standards, of course, require
plaintiffs to show actual malice to recover punitive damages. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Subsection 5-102(b)(ii) imposes
that requirement on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages.
At common law a disparaging statement was one which "is understood
to cast doubt upon the quality of another's ... chattels. . . ." RiSTATE~MENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977). For example, where a communication
about a product causes consumers to stop buying a product or dissuades
consumers from ever buying the product in the first place, the communi-
cation is disparaging.
Common-law disparagement actions required the plaintiff to prove
injury. Section 5-102 imposes the same requirement in an action for special
damages. Injury is presumed, however, when a plaintiff chooses to bring
an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Section 9-107.
Plaintiffs who bring actions for special damages under this Section must
prove each of the elements of the action by clear and convincing evidence.
The clear and convincing standard represents the drafters' policy that a
plaintiff should prevail under Section 5-102 only if the communication at
issue clearly threatens the plaintiff's commercial interests. The drafters
recognize the need to protect commercial interests, but commercial interests
do not warrant the same amount of protection as that afforded to reputation
under Section 3-101 of this Act.
Plaintiffs may choose to bring an action for declaratory judgment
pursuant to Section 9-107. The declaratory judgment remedy represents a
more efficient method of redressing injury than the traditional damages
action. The declaratory judgment works well in the disparagement context
because, as with injury to reputation, plaintiffs often may be best served if
the defendant promptly acknowledges his mistake and corrects the falsity.
To encourage plaintiffs to use the declaratory judgment remedy, Section 5-
102 allows for presumed injury and a lower burden of proof, preponderance
of the evidence.
Section 5-103. Misrepresentation Resulting in Commercial Injury.
(a) A person who has a pecuniary interest in a transaction and makes
a false communication that relates to the transaction is subject to
liability to the recipient in an action for rescission if:
(i) the communication relates solely to the economic interests
of the person and the recipient, and extends only to a
limited audience sharing those interests;
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(ii) the person specifically intends to induce the recipient to act
or to refrain from acting based upon the communication;
and
(i) the recipient reasonably relies upon the communication and
suffers commercial injury as a result. The recipient must
prove the falsity of the communication by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
(b) A person who makes a misrepresentation in the course of business
or in the course of a transaction in which the person has a pecuniary
interest is subject to liability to a recipient for special damages
pursuant to Section 9-101 for rescission if:
(i) the person fails to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or
communicating the information; and
(ii) the recipient reasonably relies on the misrepresentation and
suffers commercial injury as a result.
Liability shall extend only to a particular recipient who the
person knew would rely on the communication, or to a
recipient who is a member of a limited class to whom the
person knew the misrepresentation would be forwarded, for
guidance regarding a commercial transaction.
(c) A person who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to
the recipient for rescission, special damages pursuant to Section 9-
101, and punitive damages pursuant to Section 9-105, if:
(i) the person makes the misrepresentation with knowledge of,
or reckless disregard for, its falsity; and
(ii) the recipient reasonably relies on the misrepresentation and
suffers commercial injury as a result.
Liability shall extend to all recipients whom the person
intended to induce into action or inaction and to all reci-
pients whom the person had reason to expect the commu-
nication would reach and influence.
Comment to Section 5-103
Section 5-103 contains three distinct causes of action to redress com-
mercial injuries, replacing the common law of deceit and misrepresentation.
Subsections 5-103(a) and (b) represent the modem trend away from the
doctrine of caveat emptor and provide redress for injured purchasers without
requiring proof of intentional deception. Subsection 5-103(c) is similar to
the traditional common-law approach to fraud embodied in the English case
of Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). The Derry court held that a
misrepresentation was actionable only if the person made the misrepresen-
tation with a fraudulent intent. Subsection (c) differs from the traditional
common-law approach because the scope of liability is broader and the
subsection does not distinguish explicitly between fact and opinion.
Each subsection requires a plaintiff to establish falsity, intent to induce
reliance, reasonable and actual reliance by the recipient, and a commercial
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injury. The type of intent to induce and the type of misrepresentation
required by the particular subsections vary. The causes of action also differ
in terms of the circumstances in which liability may be imposed, the measure
of legal fault required to plead a cause of action, the scope of liability,
and the damages recoverable.
Reliance is a common element in each of the subsections. The reason-
ableness of the recipient's reliance involves an objective test. Reliance is
reasonable if a reasonable person would have regarded the subject matter
of the misrepresentation to be an important factor in deciding whether to
enter into a transaction. The recipient's reliance also is reasonable if the
person making the representation knew or had reason to know that the
specific recipient placed great emphasis on the subject matter of the mis-
representation, even if a reasonable person would not place great emphasis
on the subject matter of the misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 538 comment f (1977) (stating that fact may be material if
person making misrepresentation knows that recipient is likely to place great
emphasis on misrepresentation even though reasonable person would not
rely on fact). A recipient also must rely on the communication.
The recipient must prove that the reliance resulted in a commercial
injury. Section 5-103 does not provide redress for strictly personal, property,
or emotional injuries. The injury, not merely the damages, must be of a
pecuniary nature. Recovery for noncommercial damages resulting from a
misrepresentation is addressed in Section 6-102.
Subsection 5-103(a). The first cause of action contained in Section 5-
103 is a strict liability provision. A plaintiff need not prove an intent to
deceive or negligence on the part of the person making the communication.
Subsection 5-103(a) limits liability to cases in which the person making the
false and material communication has a pecuniary interest in the transaction
and the communication related to the transaction. The premise of this
subsection is that a person with a pecuniary interest in a transaction should
communicate accurately about matters related to the transaction.
Imposing strict liability for materially false statements on a party to a
commercial transaction is not new to tort law. See Williston, Liability for
Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415, 435 (1911) (noting that
contract and tort actions most similar to tort action for deceit did not
require actual intent to deceive); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749, 757
(1930) (arguing that each jurisdiction needs both formula requiring intent
and one of strict liability). But see Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74
CoLuM. L. REv. 40 (1974) (arguing that other commentators have misread
case law and that strict liability for misrepresentations is not widespread).
The Restatement of Torts contains a strict liability provision similar to
subsection 5-103(a). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 552C (1977);
see also W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 748
(5th ed. 1984).
Subsection (a) is limited in scope. To be subject to liability, the person
must have a pecuniary interest in the transaction that is the subject of the
misrepresentation, and the person specifically must intend to induce the
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particular recipient into action or inaction. A person cannot specifically
intend to induce another unless the person making the false communication
knows the recipient.
The limited scope of subsection (a) also is manifested by the requirement
that the subsection shall apply only to commercial misrepresentations made
to a "limited audience" where members of the audience share the same
commercial interest as the person making the communication. Subsection
(a), therefore, does not apply to one using a medium to make misrepresen-
tations unless the medium is of very limited circulation and the person uses
the medium to promote a commercial transaction to an identified and
known audience interested in the transaction. See generally Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that
credit report sent to only five subscribers does not involve matter of public
concern so as to merit greater first amendment protection than matter of
private concern). A newspaper, even a small town paper, has more than a
"limited audience," and an entire newspaper audience would not share the
economic interest of the advertiser in the transaction proposed in an
advertisement. As a result, a newspaper advertiser would not be subject to
liability for falsity in an advertisement under subsection (a). Furthermore,
subsection (a) would not apply to a media defendant that publishes an
advertisement because the media defendant does not have a pecuniary
interest in the transaction that the advertisement encouraged. See MacKown
v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 289 Ill. App. 59, 6 N.E.2d 526 (1937).
Relief under subsection 5-103(a) is confined to rescission of the subject
transaction. By precluding money damages as a remedy, subsection (a)
departs from existing case law that recognizes a cause of action in strict
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNr) oF TORTS § 552C comment b (1977)
(allowing damages to cover difference between value parted with and value
received in transaction). Subsection (a) bears a close resemblance to a breach
of warranty action. Contract actions, like those for breach of warranty,
however, give protections to the defendant that subsection (a) does not. See
Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 40 (1974) (arguing
against position § 552C of the REsTATEm:ENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS takes
because Restatement position ignores contract law implications such as parol
evidence rule and liquidated damage provisions). A plaintiff who chooses
subsection (a) rather than a contract action sacrifices the ability to recover
money damages in exchange for preventing the defendant from relying on
contract defenses and doctrine. Proof of the intent or negligence of the
defendant may involve protracted litigation. Therefore, subsection (a) may
prove to be a useful alternative for a plaintiff who would be satisfied with
rescission of the contract.
Subsection 5-103(a) contains an added safeguard for defendants. The
recipient must prove falsity of the communication by clear and convincing
evidence. Subsections 5-103(b) and (c) do not require a heightened burden
of proof of the falsity of the misrepresentation, but subsections (b) and (c)
require proof of legal fault. Subsection (a)'s heightened burden of proof of
falsity offsets the lack of a culpability requirement.
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To illustrate the operation of subsection (a), assume the following facts.
A and B are negotiating over the sale of A's house. Prior to the negotiations,
X Pest Company, widely respected in the pest control industry, searched
A's house for signs of termite infestation. X told A that A's house "had
no termite infestation." X failed adequately to check the house for termites.
A subsequent inspection found that the house had termites that had caused
material structural damage to the house. Consequently, X's statement was
erroneous. A related X's statement to B in the course of the negotiations.
B, in reliance on A's statement, purchases A's house. A is subject to liability
to B regardless of X's prior statement.
Subsection 5-103(b). This subsection imposes a duty on one who makes
representations in the course of that person's business or a commercial
transaction. The duty requires that a person exercise reasonable care in
obtaining and communicating information. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 552(1) (1977) (imposing similar duty). Subsection 5-103(b) requires
proof of negligence in obtaining or communicating the misrepresentation.
Negligent misrepresentation is an erosion of the "scienter" requirement
of deceit. The common-law requirement of an intent to deceive is not
required by subsection (b). Accordingly, the duty imposed by subsection (b)
is limited in scope, and the scope of liability resulting from such misrepre-
sentations is narrower than the scope of common-law deceit.
Subsection 5-103(b) imposes a duty to refrain from negligent misrep-
resentation in two situations. The first situation, when the person has a
pecuniary interest in a transaction, is the same as in subsection (a). The
second situation, when the person is acting in the course of the person's
business, is slightly broader than the first situation. A person employed to
supply information to influence a commercial transaction is held to the
same standard of care as a person with an interest in that transaction, but
this broadened duty is limited by the scope of the person's liability.
The liability of a person who breaches the duty of care extends only to
a particular recipient or to a recipient who is a member of a limited class,
of which the person making the representation is aware and intended to
influence regarding a commercial transaction. A particular recipient is one
known by the person. The person must intend the misrepresentation to
influence that recipient regarding a commercial transaction.
A recipient who is a member of a limited class and not known specif-
ically by the person also may recover under Section 5-103 if certain require-
ments are met. The recipient must be a member of a limited class, the
members of which the person intended the misrepresentation to influence
regarding a commercial transaction. The person must know of the limited
class, though the person need not know of the particular recipient. Conse-
quently, neither an advertiser in a widely published periodical nor the
periodical's publisher is subject to liability for negligent misrepresentations.
See First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding provider of loose leaf summaries of business operations and
finances of large corporations not liable to one of its 7500 subscribers for
negligent misstatement); see also Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d
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898, 900 (Ohio 1986) (holding that subscriber of the Wall Street Journal is
not a member of limited class of persons that negligent misstatement was
intended to influence).
Subsection 5-103(b) is intended to be consistent with the reasoning of
two of the leading cases. Ultramares v. Touche Corp., 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
In Ultramares the Court of Appeals of New York refused to extend the
liability of accountants who had made a negligent misrepresentation to an
indeterminate class of recipients. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at
444. In Glanzer the same court held a bean weigher liable for negligence
to the buyer for misweighing beans, although it was the seller who contracted
with the weigher to have the beans weighed. See Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 241,
135 N.E.at 277. But see Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEx. L. REv.
1, 35 (1976) (arguing that Glanzer involved innocent misrepresentation
despite the resulting incongruence that Glanzer then would have extended
broader liability than Ultramares and would have done so in a no-fault
contest).
To illustrate the operation of subsection 5-103(b), assume the following
facts. A placed his house for sale. A hired X Pest Control, widely respected
in the pest control industry, to check A's house for termite infestation. A
informed X that the information on termite infestation would be supplied
to prospective purchasers of A's house. X detected no sign of termites in
A's house. X, however, failed to check the baseboards of one room where
termite infestation was severe. X certified to A that A's house "had no
termite infestation." A then told B, a prospective purchaser of A's house,
that the house was free from termites. B, in reliance on A's statement,
purchased A's house. B later discovered the termite infestation. A is not
subject to liability to B. X, however, is subject to liability to B. X knew
that the misrepresentation would be forwarded to a limited class of reci-
pients, and B is a member of that limited class.
Subsection 5-103(c). This subsection imposes liability on one who makes
a misrepresentation intentionally or with reckless disregard of its truth.
Evidence of actual subjective intent is not necessary to prove intent to
deceive. Proof of intent may consist of evidence of the nonexistence of the
matter asserted in the misrepresentation. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity of
an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583, (1958) (citations omitted).
Reckless disregard of the misrepresentation's truth may be proved by a
showing that the person entertained serious doubts regarding the truth of
the misrepresentation. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
The fault requirement under this subsection is greater than that required
under subsection 5-103(b). Damages and scope of liability are correspond-
ingly greater. Under subsection 5-103(c) punitive damages are available if
the conduct involved in the deception is particularly egregious. Punitive
damage awards are appropriate to deter the commission of intentional
deceit.
The scope of liability of subsection 5-103(c) is broader than that of
subsection (a) or (b) in two ways. First, a plaintiff may recover under
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subsection (c) regardless of whether the defendant had a pecuniary interest
in the transaction and regardless of whether the defendant made the mis-
representation in the course of business. The injury, however, still must be
commercial in nature. The intent to induce and intent to deceive require-
ments of subsection 5-103(c) justify its broader scope. Second, the person
may be liable to all recipients that the person had reason to expect the
communication to reach and influence. This standard is both objective and
subjective, allowing for liability to be imposed even if the person did not
in fact expect the communication to reach and influence the recipient. The
person, however, must have sufficient knowledge to cause a reasonable
person to expect that the misrepresentation would reach and influence the
recipient. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 531 comment d (1977).
Constitutional protection for commercial speech should not affect the
constitutionality of Section 5-103. Although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized limited first amendment protection for commercial speech, false or
deceptive commercial speech is subject to state regulation. Posadas De
Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986). Subsection 5-103(a) requires a false communication. Subsections (b)
and (c) require a misrepresentation. Subsection 1-101(9) defines misrepre-
sentation to include both a false communication and, in certain circum-
stances, a communication that falsely implies underlying facts. In other
words, a misrepresentation may be a statement of judgment, but only if
the statement falsely implies facts underlying the judgment. Because Section
5-103 regulates only false commercial speech or commercial speech that
falsely implies knowledge of relevant facts, Section 5-103 falls within the
area of commercial speech that the states constitutionally may regulate.
Article 6
Injury to Other Protected Interests
Section 6-101. Communication Generating Conduct that Produces Harm.
(a) A person who, specifically intending to cause imminent lawless
conduct, makes a communication that advocates and is likely in the
circumstances to produce imminent lawless conduct shall be subject
to liability to any person injured in body or property by any conduct
caused by the communication.
(b) Absent proof of conspiracy, a person associated with the commu-
nicator and on whose behalf the statement was made is not liable
under this Section. Proof of conspiracy requires a showing beyond
a reasonable doubt of:
(i) an agreement between two or more persons;
(ii) intent thereby to cause imminent lawless conduct by advo-
cating conduct likely to cause harm; and
(iii) with respect to an organization's liability, agreement by an
individual with authority to bind the organization.
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(c) In an action brought under this Section, an injured person may
recover damages pursuant to Sections 9-101, 9-103, and 9-104.
(d) The injured person shall bear the burden of proof of all elements
under Section 6-101(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
Comment to Section 6-101
The purpose of Section 6-101 is to create civil liability for incitement.
Section 6-101 expands the "clear and present danger" test, which the
Supreme Court first articulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919), beyond criminal liability in the context of national security to include
civil liability for injury resulting from the communication. Section 6-101
allows recovery for personal injury or property damage that another person
caused by intentional exhortations of another to create a danger of imminent
harm.
The Supreme Court has recognized certain types of speech that are not
protected by the first amendment. These areas are obscenity, child pornog-
raphy, fighting words, purposefully made or recklessly made false statements
of fact, and incitement to imminent lawless activity. The Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), created the constitutional
justification for a cause of action under Section 6-101. The Schenck analysis
clearly permits the expansion of the clear and present danger test to the
civil incitement arena in cases where the circumstances "bring about the
substantive evils that congress has the right to prevent." Schenck, 249 U.S.
at 52.
Subsection 6-101(a) requires a showing that the defendant by his com-
munication intended to advocate imminent conduct by the recipient of the
communication, that the defendant's intention was to cause lawless action,
and that the circumstances were such that imminent lawless conduct by the
recipient was likely. The imminent lawless conduct requirement does not
require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant would have been convicted
of the lawless action, but rather that the conduct alleged by the plaintiff in
the pleadings is defined by the laws of the State as a felony or serious
misdemeanor. A plaintiff also must allege either physical injury or property
damage. Section 6-101 does not require proof of the actual occurrence of
the advocated lawless conduct but does require that the plaintiff prove that
the defendant specifically intended the lawless conduct to occur. Plaintiffs,
therefore, may recover damages when lawless action as defined in subsection
1-101(6) was intended and advocated by the defendant and under the
circumstances was likely to have occurred, even if injury was not the result
of lawless action.
Subsection 6-101(b) is included to prevent an individual who does not
have the legal ability to bind the organization with respect to the commu-
nication from holding the organization itself liable for the consequences of
the communication unless the plaintiff makes a showing of criminal con-
spiracy. Concern existed that failure to shield the organization from liability
would chill the most fundamental type of speech, political opinion. Liability
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is imputed to an organization only if there was a pre-existing agreement
that held the organization liable for the actions of the individual inciter.
Subsection 6-101(d) imposes a clear and convincing evidence standard
for actions under subsection 6-101(a). Although the Supreme Court has
held that incitement to imminent lawless action does not fall within the
protection of the first amendment, the Constitution probably requires that
this high burden of proof be imposed in establishing incitement.
Section 6-102. Noncommercial Fraud.
(a) A person who makes a false or misleading communication to an
individual, either knowing its falsity or entertaining serious doubts
as to its truth, and with the intent to induce the individual to act
or refrain from acting in reliance on the false or misleading com-
munication, is subject to liability to the individual for damages
pursuant to Sections 9-101, 9-102, 9-103, and 9-104 if the individual
reasonably relied on the communication and suffered foreseeable
injury as a result.
(b) An individual seeking damages under this Section must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the communication was false or
misleading, that the individual reasonably relied on it, that injury
occurred as a result, and that the injury was foreseeable to the
person making the communication.
(c) An individual seeking damages under this Section is precluded from
seeking damages under Section 5-103.
Comment to Section 6-102
Section 6-102 is designed for situations in which, although no pecuniary
interest is at stake, the fraudulent nature of the defendant's communication
resulted in the plaintiff's injury. The tort of misrepresentation has been
recognized in limited circumstances and no essential reason exists to prevent
a deceit action from being maintained where interests other than commercial
and pecuniary interests are involved. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 726 (5th ed. 1984).
Section 6-102 allows compensation for a plaintiff injured by a deliber-
ately fraudulent misrepresentation. When a pecuniary interest is not at
stake, injury for fraudulent misconduct often is emotional. Morris v.
MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957) (bigamy); Work v. Campbell,
164 Cal. 343, 128 P. 943 (1912) (inducing plaintiff to leave husband); Burr
v. Board of County Commissioners of Stark County, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69,
491 N.E. 2d 1101 (1986) (adoption of child with serious genetic difficulties).
Section 6-102 also allows a plaintiff to recover for emotional harm for
mental anguish and suffering in addition to actual lost earnings, medical
expenses, and damage to property.
A plaintiff, however, is barred from recovery for commercial fraud
under Section 5-103 if the plaintiff brings an action under Section 6-102.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, double recovery for the same injury
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should not be allowed. Second, recovery under Section 6-102 centers on
estoppel principles absent pecuniary interest, and the resulting damages
focus on the plaintiff's reliance. In Section 5-103 the focus is on the
pecuniary interest itself. The two interests are similar, but noncommercial
fraud is much more difficult to prove, and although noncommercial fraud
may involve pecuniary loss of some type, the major injury is more tangible.
Emotional distress is not cause for recovery under Section 5-103.
[Section 6-103. Liability for Racial, Sexual, [Ethnic], or Religious
Harassment.
(a) A person who intentionally engages in a course of conduct that is
addressed to an individual, that is specifically intended and reason-
ably likely to harass or intimidate the individual because of the
individual's race, sex, [ethnic origin], or religion, and that directly
causes serious emotional distress, is subject to liability to the indi-
vidual:
(i) for damages pursuant to Sections 9-101, 9-102, and 9-104;
and
(ii) in an action for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 9-108.
(b) For purposes of this Section, "course of conduct" means a pattern
of communication evincing a continuity of purpose.]
Comment to Section 6-103
Section 6-103 provides a recovery for injury to the emotional well-being
of individuals who are the victims of intentional, personalized harassment
based on the individual's race, sex, ethnic origin, or religion. Section 6-103
recognizes that in addition to suffering emotional distress, victims of ha-
rassment also may suffer pecuniary loss or property damage. Liability
extends to such conduct as threats of harm to an individual or to the
individual's property, repeated or systematic abusive or insulting commu-
nication that reasonably causes emotional injury, and the burning of crosses
or placement on an individual's property of other words or symbols com-
monly associated with racial, sexual, religious, or ethnic harassment.
Section 6-103 reflects the policy that members of groups that tradition-
ally have been harassed or discriminated against should be protected in tort
from harassment that is based on their membership in a particular group.
The Section thus provides legal protection against affronts to the interests
of personal dignity, self-respect, and psychological and physical well-being.
A cause of action for harassment communicates that such behavior no
longer will be tolerated in our society. The legal and ethical systems of our
society recognize the principle that individuals are entitled to treatment
which does not ridicule their humanity by disrespect of their privacy or
moral worth. See Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HAtv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 143-
44 (1982) (asserting that racial harassment is serious transgression "because
it derogates by race, a characteristic central to one's self-image"). Section
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6-103 offers protection that current law does not adequately provide.
In light of the first amendment, the occasions for recovery under Section
6-103 necessarily have been limited. Actionable harassment must involve a
course of conduct that specifically is intended and reasonably likely to
harass or intimidate an individual solely on the basis of the individual's
sex, race, religion, or ethnic origin. The "course of conduct" and "intent"
requirements are designed to eliminate first amendment concerns by ensuring
that liability will not arise for communication with legitimate free speech
value.
The free speech clause of the first amendment protects the expression
of ideas, the free flow of information, and protects against the suppression
of minority views by the majority. "But individuals abused on account of
their race, color, [sex], or ethnicity are also entitled to protection." See
Lasson, Racial Defamation As Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment,
17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 11, 47 (1985) (discussing relationship of first
amendment and racial abuse). Where there is not an expression of ideas or
opinion, no reason exists why the Constitution must protect the speech
itself. Id. at 30. Section 6-103 is drafted to require proof that the course
of conduct had no other legitimate, constitutionally protected purpose.
Because the statute involves speech intended solely to harass and not speech
intended to communicate ideas, Section 6-103 addresses communication that
falls outside the first amendment's protection.
The Supreme Court has stated recently that the capacity of speech to
cause emotional disturbance is not, alone, sufficient to justify its abridgment.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Falwell Court,
however, was careful to limit its holding to public officials and public
figures, after noting that "at the heart of the first amendment is the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern." Id. Thus, by impli-
cation, if the speech does not involve a public figure or a matter of public
concern, emotional disturbance is enough to justify regulation of the speech.
"When the plaintiff is a private figure and the speech does not involve any
issue of public concern, the case is treated for first amendment purposes as
if it were nonexpressive conduct, and no first amendment restrictions will
apply, relegating the defendant's protection solely to that available under
applicable [law]." Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment:
An Analysis of Hustler v, Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423, 467 (1988). The
speech that Section 6-103 proscribes always will be of nonpublic concern
because the only purpose of the speech must be to harass or intimidate a
specific individual, and because no exposition of ideas is involved. Moreover,
although Section 6-103 covers speech that may be addressed to a "public
figure," liability under Section 6-103 is based not on the individual's status
as a public figure but on the individual's status as a member of a particular
race, sex, religion, or ethnic group. The privileges contained in Section 8-
108 should eliminate any remaining concern about liability for protected
speech.
Existing law indicates that harassing communication may be curtailed.
For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
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discrimination, including harassment based on an employee's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). Additionally,
some states provide a private right of action under state antidiscrimination
and human rights statutes. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 43 (West 1982) (providing
for freedom from personal insult); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2556 (1981)
(providing for private cause of action under human rights provision); ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 68, para. 2-102(D) (Smith-Hurd 1980) (declaring that sexual
harassment is civil rights violation). Other states have statutes that declare
harassment to be a criminal offense. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-71-209
(1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 525.070 (Michie 1985). Moreover, a few states provide for civil
remedies under criminal malicious harassment statutes that specifically pro-
hibit racial, religious, or ethnic harassment. See IDAHO CODE § 18-7901
(1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.36.080 (1988).
Several state statutes concerning harassment require that the harassment
tend to lead to immediate violence or breach of the peace. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-8 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-9-111 (1973). Words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace ("fighting words") are outside the
protection of the Constitution. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). Section 6-103, however, does not require the course of conduct
to lead to violence or an immediate breach of the peace because Section 6-
103 recognizes that speech can cause serious emotional injury even if the
speech does not lead to an immediate breach of the peace. Two states
currently have statutes that provide civil actions for racial, religious, or
ethnic harassment that do not contain a fighting words requirement. See
R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-35 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-42.1 (Supp. 1988);
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). But see Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Although the speech at issue in Brandenburg
included derogatory statements about Jews and Blacks, Brandenburg can
be distinguished from a cause of action for harassment. In Brandenburg
the speakers were the only people present when the statements were made.
Id. at 445. Moreover, the speech was not directed at any specific individual
and was clearly political speech that the first amendment protects. Id. 448-
49. Harassing speech that Section 6-103 proscribes, on the other hand, is
different in kind from the speech in Brandenburg because Section 6-103
proscribes speech that is directed at a particular individual with the intent
to harass and thereby to cause emotional injury to the individual.
The cause of action for racial harassment under Section 6-103 essentially
is a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Numerous
plaintiffs have used intentional infliction of emotional distress as a means
of recovering for injuries resulting from harassment. For example, in
Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977),
the Supreme Court for the State of Washington considered whether a
Mexican-American's allegations that fellow employees had engaged in a
campaign of racial harassment against the plaintiff were sufficient to support
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a claim against the plaintiff's employer for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 737, 565 P.2d at 1174. After considering the extent of the
racial abuse, which included accusations of theft and racist jokes, slurs,
and comments, the court explained that "racial epithets which were once a
part of common usage may not now be looked upon as 'mere insulting
language."' Id. at 741, 565 P.2d at 1177. Accordingly, the Contreras court
held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id.
The Contreras court correctly recognized that although the general rule
states that a plaintiff cannot recover for mere insult, indignity, annoyance,
or abuse without showing other aggravating circumstances, intentional ha-
rassment based on an individual's race, sex, religion, or ethnic origin is
more than a mere insult and, therefore, should create liability for serious
emotional distress that results from the harassment. See id.; see also Rogers
v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 527 (D.D.C. 1981)
(holding that alleged sexual harassment exceeded mere insults, indignities,
and petty oppression and stated cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 947, 603 P.2d 58,
67, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 150 (1979) (holding that intentional infliction of
emotional distress may include humiliation, anxiety, and mental anguish);
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 217
(1970) (holding that plaintiff stated cause of action for emotional distress
by alleging that supervisor intended to cause mental anguish by referring
to plaintiff as "nigger"); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, -, 358 P.2d
344, 347 (1961) (holding that repeated sexual harassment is sufficient grounds
for recovery based on intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Section 6-103 is bracketed to indicate divisions of opinion among the
drafters regarding whether freedom from harassment based on an indivi-
dual's race, sex, ethnic origin, or religion is an interest that the drafters
wished to protect in the context of tort liability based on communication.
References to "ethnic origin" also are bracketed to indicate divisions of
opinion regarding whether freedom from harassment based on an indivi-
dual's ethnic origin should be included in Section 6-103. Approximately
one-half of the drafters felt that ethnic origin should not be included
because the inclusion of ethnic origin would create too much confusion over
the scope of the term. Moreover, the drafters feared that if ethnic origin
were included there would be little justification for not extending the
protection of Section 6-103 to harassment based on an individual's affiliation
with other organizations, and that such an extension would make Section
6-103 overbroad.
Section 6-103 does not preclude other remedies available under existing
law. The Section should not be construed to eliminate recovery for non-
communicative forms of harassment. An individual conceivably could re-
cover under this Section and still be able to recover under existing state or
federal statutes for injuries arising out of the same harassment incident.
For example, the statutes and regulations dealing with harassment in the
employment context, while arguably concerned to some extent with emo-
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tional well-being, are concerned more with job security and preventing
unreasonable and unlawful discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (viewing sexual
harassment as form of disparate treatment or intentional discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Moreover, the existing
harassment statutes provide remedies such as reinstatement and backpay
that are not provided under Section 6-103. See, e.g., TITLE VII OF THE CivIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1989).
Article 7
Breach of Confidence
Section 7-101. Liability for Breach of Confidence.
A person who possesses information is subject to liability to a person
who supplied the information if:
(a) the possessor discloses the information, having expressly agreed to
receive and hold it in confidence in the course of a nonpersonal
relationship;
(b) the possessor discloses the information, having received it in the
course of a customarily confidential relationship;
(c) the possessor discloses the information, having acquired it through
improper means from another person, knowing that the person had
an obligation under subsections 7-101(a) or 7-101(b) to maintain its
confidentiality;
(d) the possessor discloses the information, having acquired it knowing
that its receipt is a direct consequence of another person's breach
of confidence as defined in subsections 7-101(a), 7-101(b), or 7-
101(c); or
(e) the possessor negligently maintains the confidentiality of the infor-
mation, having an obligation under subsections 7-101(a) or 7-101(b)
to hold it in confidence, and a disclosure of the information is the
proximate result of the possessor's negligence.
Comment to Section 7-101
Article 7 establishes a statutory cause of action for breach of confidence
to clarify and strengthen the existing common-law approaches to liability
for breach of confidence. Traditionally, plaintiffs seeking damages for
breach of confidence have had to prove that the defendant wrongfully
disclosed confidential information which the plaintiff supplied to the defen-
dant in confidence and that, as a result of the defendant's disclosure, the
plaintiff suffered injury. See Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (patient claiming psychiatrist wrongfully disclosed
confidential information); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho
578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) (bank customer claiming bank wrongfully disclosed
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confidential information). Courts have struggled to identify the proper legal
theory that supports the obligation of confidence. Courts have applied the
traditional theories of invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, and
breach of implied statutory duty to impose civil liability for breach of
confidence. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D. 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d
801 (1982) (considering several theories of liability for breach of confidence).
In applying these traditional theories, however, courts have failed to establish
a legal framework that adequately protects the individual and societal
interests in securing confidential relationships. Drawing from the British
Law Commission's draft of a statutory tort for breach of confidence and
from a thoughtful student note that formulates an independent tort for
breach of confidence, Article 7 establishes a legal framework for protecting
confidential relationships. See The Law Commission, Breach of Confidence,
Law. Com. No. 110 (H.M. Stat. Off. 1981) (proposing to replace common-
law breach of confidence with new statutory tort) [hereinafter Law Com-
mission's Tort]; Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1426 (1982) (maintaining that traditional theories of liability do
not adequately protect interests at stake in confidential relationships and
proposing independent tort of breach of confidence).
A disclosure of confidential information invades two interests of the
person who supplied the information during the course of a confidential
relationship. Note, supra, at 1434. First, the disclosure invades the person's
primary interest in preserving the security of the confidential relationship
through which a person can reveal embarrassing or troublesome personal
information to promote one's health or welfare. Second, a disclosure of
confidential information invades the person's secondary interest in prevent-
ing injuries that result from the circulation of the information. These injuries
could include humiliation, ridicule, emotional distress, and loss of business
or professional relationships.
In addition to frustrating a person's interests in protecting the security
of confidential relationships, a disclosure of confidential information invades
society's interest in assuring that individuals will respect certain types of
confidential relationships. Note, supra, at 1435. For example, because society
is concerned with protecting the physical and mental health of individuals,
society has an interest in encouraging individuals to feel secure in supplying
all information concerning their health to doctors. Similarly, because society
is concerned with the personal development of individuals, society has an
interest in protecting the security of confidential discussions with counselors,
therapists, teachers, and other individuals.
To protect the important individual and societal interests in preserving
confidential relationships, Section 7-101 establishes five separate bases upon
which a person may claim that a disclosure violates confidentiality. The
protection that Section 7-101 affords extends only to persons who supply
confidential information in the course of a relationship that carries an
obligation of confidentiality. Thus, a person who is the subject of confi-
dential information has no cause of action unless that person is also the
person who supplied the confidential information. Allowing the person who
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is the subject to sue would serve to protect the person's interest in main-
taining control over disclosures concerning intimate facts, not the personal
and societal interests in securing confidential relationships. See Law Com-
mission's Tort, supra, at 89-90 (explaining rationale for limiting breach of
confidence plaintiffs to persons who supply confidential information); see
also MODEL CommINicATW- TORTS ACT § 4-101 (establishing liability for
disclosure of intimate facts). The distinction is between protecting infor-
mation because the information is subject to an obligation of confidence
and protecting information because of the nature of the information in
question.
Subsection 7-101(a). This subsection establishes liability for disclosing
information that a person expressly agrees to receive and hold in confidence
in a nonpersonal relationship. The requirement that the person agree to
receive and hold the information in confidence serves two important pur-
poses. First, the requirement precludes persons from thrusting a duty of
confidentiality upon persons who are unwilling to undertake the duty.
Second, the requirement notifies the receiver of the information that the
information is not fair game for gossip and sets aside the information from
the receiver's general knowledge. In addition, the term "nonpersonal rela-
tionship" precludes liability for disclosing information that a person receives
in the course of a personal relationship. Although recognizing that persons
often reveal damaging information to friends and family members, subsec-
tion 7-101(a) is intended to prohibit the law of confidence from intruding
into family and personal relationships. See Note, supra, at 1460 (maintaining
that breach of confidence law should not intrude into personal relationships).
Problems would arise if a person were allowed to sue a friend or family
member for breach of confidence, including the difficult evidentiary deter-
minations of whether a confidential relationship existed, whether the defen-
dant learned the information outside the relationship, and whether the
plaintiff consented to the disclosure. Id.
Subsection 7-101(b). This subsection establishes liability for disclosing
information that a person receives in the course of a customarily confidential
relationship. See Note, supra, at 1460 (proposing that actionable duty of
confidentiality should attach to nonpersonal relationships customarily un-
derstood to carry an obligation of confidence). The term "customarily" is
intended to establish a standard that is stricter than the reasonable person
test for determining the existence of a confidential relationship. Under the
reasonable person test, a person has a duty of confidence if, under the
circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that a confidential
relationship existed. See id. at 1457 (discussing British common-law reason-
able person test). Under the stricter standard of subsection 7-101(b), a
person who receives information does not have a duty of confidence unless
(1) that person and the person who supplied the information were in a pre-
existing nonpersonal relationship and (2) relationships of a similar kind
generally are understood to carry a duty of confidentiality. Id. at 1461
(defining "customarily" standard). A customarily confidential relationship
does not exist if only the particular facts of a particular relationship establish
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an expectation of confidentiality. Accordingly, customarily confidential re-
lationships include but are not limited to doctor-patient relationships, at-
torney-client relationships, priest-penitent relationships, accountant-client
relationships, and bank-customer relationships. The category would not
include, for example, journalist-source relationships because those relation-
ships generally are based on express understanding.
Subsection 7-101(c). This subsection imposes liability against a person
who discloses information that the person acquired through improper means
from another person who had an obligation to maintain the confidentiality
of the information. This subsection is based on a section of the British Law
Commission's proposed statutory tort for breach of confidence. See Law
Commission's Tort, supra, at 113-23 (proposing liability for disclosing
confidential information improperly taken from another). A person who
employs improper means to acquire information stands in the shoes of the
person who had possession of the information. Thus, a person who burgles
and reads confidential office files is in the same position as the person who
establishes and maintains those files subject to an obligation of confiden-
tiality. Obtaining information by improper means does not necessarily
involve taking information in circumstances that would amount to criminal
behavior. The essential inquiry is whether a person has acquired information
without the express or implied authority of the person holding the infor-
mation in confidence. Moreover, if a person exceeds any authority to handle
confidential information in a particular way or for a particular purpose,
the person is considered to have acted without authority. For example, a
messenger who receives a confidential document for the sole purpose of
hand delivering the document assumes a duty of confidentiality under this
subsection if he reads the document. Finally, a person assumes a duty of
confidentiality under this subsection if the person obtains information by
using violence, threats, or deception against a person holding the informa-
tion.
Subsection 7-101(d). Liability is imposed under this subsection on a
person who discloses information knowing that she or he had acquired the
information as a result of another person's breach of confidence. A person
who acquires information that already is impressed with an obligation of
confidence becomes subject to an obligation of confidence at the time the
person (1) acquires the information and (2) learns or ought to have learned
that the information is so impressed. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d
201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (imposing liability against husband
who published information that he knew was revealed to his wife in course
of confidential physician-patient relationship).
Subsection 7-101(e). This subsection imposes liability on a person who
negligently maintains information which has been received in confidence
when a disclosure of that information occurs as a proximate result of the
person's negligence. A person who has an obligation of confidentiality has
a parallel obligation to exercise due care in assuring that other persons will
not have access to that information. Even if another person employs
improper means to gain access to the information, a person still is liable
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under subsection 7-101(e) for subsequent disclosures if the person's negli-
gence in maintaining the confidential information assisted in the success of
the improper means. For example, a doctor who negligently leaves confi-
dential medical records out in the open is liable under subsection 7-101(e)
if one of his patients peruses the records and subsequently discloses infor-
mation contained in the records.
Section 7-102. Privileges for Breach of Confidence.
In addition to the privileges contained in Section 8-107, a person is not
liable for breach of confidence under Section 7-101 if:
(a) the disclosed information is known widely by the public;
(b) the interest in the disclosure of the information outweighs the
interest in preserving the confidentiality of the information; or
(c) the disclosure is made with the consent of the supplier of the
information in a nonpersonal confidential relationship.
Comment to Section 7-102
Recognizing that a disclosure of confidential information may be excused
or justified in certain circumstances, Section 7-102 establishes three general
privileges against liability for breach of confidence. First, subsection 7-
102(a) excludes a person from liability for disclosure of information that at
the time of disclosure was in the public domain. This privilege is based on
a provision in the British Law Commission's proposed tort of breach of
confidence. See Law Commission's Tort, supra Comment to Section 7-101,
at 27. Under the public domain privilege, information is in the public
domain if widely known by the public. The "widely known" standard is
stated in broad terms to allow courts to decide in the circumstances of each
case whether the information at the time of the alleged wrongful disclosure
was widely known to persons outside the confidential relationship or whether
the information was, instead, relatively secret. A person who receives
information in confidence should not escape liability for disclosing that
information solely on the ground that the information is technically acces-
sible to the public. The essential inquiry is not whether the information is
located in a record that is accessible to the public but rather whether the
information is so widely known that it has become public information that
cannot be regarded as secret.
Subsection 7-102(b) provides that a person is not liable for breach of
confidence if the public interest in the disclosure of the information out-
weighs the interest in protecting its confidentiality. The public interest
privilege is stated in broad terms to encompass the various public interest-
based privileges that courts previously have established and to allow courts
to weigh the competing public interests on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly,
Section 7-102(b) includes but is not limited to the following common-law
privileges against breach of confidence: (1) the public safety privilege, which
provides that a person is not liable for disclosing confidential information
to protect public health and safety, see, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104
[Vol. 47:1
MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT
Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (holding that physician was privileged to
notify hotel in which patient was staying that patient had contagious disease
and that hotel should disinfect patient's sheets); (2) the fraud or crime
privilege, which provides that a person is not liable for disclosing confidential
information to prevent fraud or crime, see, e.g., State v. McCray, 15 Wash.
App. 810, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976) (holding that bank was privileged to disclose
depositor's bad checks to police); and (3) the legal process privilege, which
provides that a person is not liable for disclosing confidential information
under compulsion of legal process, see, e.g., Doe v. DiGenova, 642 F.
Supp. 624, 632 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that Veterans Administration was
not liable for disclosing plaintiff's confidential record pursuant to grand
jury subpoena).
In applying these traditional public interest privileges and in balancing
the competing public interests on a case-by-case basis, a court should review
all the circumstances, including the need for the information to vindicate a
public interest, the manner in which the disclosing person acquired the
information, and the extent and use of the disclosure. In reviewing the
extent and use of the disclosure, a court may consider whether the disclosure
was confined to those persons who were appropriate to receive the infor-
mation. For example, because the public has an interest in encouraging
citizens to help police apprehend criminals, a court may conclude that it
was proper to disclose a crime to the police but improper and unjustified
to disclose a crime to a newspaper reporter. Finally, in applying the public
interest privilege, courts should refrain from equating the term "public
interest" with the term "public curiosity." Cf. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d
201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (noting that in no case has
curiosity or education of medical profession superseded physician's duty of
confidentiality). The essential inquiry is whether the disclosure of the con-
fidential information was in the public interest and not merely of public
interest.
Subsection 7-102(c) provides that a person is privileged to disclose
confidential information if the supplier of the information consents to the
disclosure. A person who consents to disclosure of information supplied in
confidence terminates any duty of confidentiality with respect to that
information. A person impliedly may consent to disclosure of information
if the person acts inconsistently with his interest in preserving the confiden-
tiality of the information. For example, a public official who reveals
confidential information to a doctor impliedly may consent to the doctor's
subsequent disclosure if the public official revealed the same information
to a newspaper that questioned the official's ability to hold office. In
applying the consent privilege, a court should analyze carefully the scope
of the consent and determine whether the disclosure was within the scope
of consent.
A person's consent to a disclosure of confidential information does not
preclude liability for disclosing invasive, intimate facts under Section 4-101
of this Act or for injury to reputation under Section 3-101. For example,
if X tells his psychiatrist Y an invasive intimate fact about his wife W, X
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can shield Y from liability under Section 7-101 by consenting to the
disclosure of the fact. X's consent, however, does not shield Y from W's
potential suit under Section 4-101 for disclosing an invasive, intimate fact.
In addition to the privileges contained in Section 7-102, Section 8-108
of this Act contains privileges that universally preclude liability for certain
types of communications. First, subsection 8-108(b) establishes a privilege
for communications that are made in the course of a person's testimony
under oath in a judicial or legislative proceeding. Thus, a person is not
liable for a breach of confidence if the breach occurs while the person is
under oath. The drafters decided that the public interest in preserving the
efficiency of the judicial and legislative process outweighed any benefits a
supplier of confidential information may receive by excepting breaches of
confidence from subsection 8-108(b). Subsection 8-108(b), however, does
not compel disclosure; nor would a disclosure privileged under Article 8
absolve the disclosing party from liability or sanctions arising under other
law or under professional codes of responsibility.
In addition, subsection 8-108(d) establishes a privilege for communica-
tions that a person makes as a fair and accurate report of a judicial or
legislative proceeding. Thus, if a person acquires confidential information
by witnessing a judicial or legislative proceeding, the person is not liable
for a breach of confidence if the person discloses the information in a fair
and accurate report of the proceeding. The fair and accurate report privilege
applies regardless of whether the person knows that he obtained the infor-
mation as a direct result of another person's breach of confidence. The
drafters agreed that the public interest in receiving fair and accurate reports
of judicial and legislative proceedings outweighed the interest in preserving
the confidentiality of information.
Section 7-103. Remedies for Breach of Confidence.
Recovery for breach of confidence may include:
(a) special damages pursuant to Section 9-101;
(b) damages resulting from emotional harm pursuant to Section 9-102;
(c) punitive damages pursuant to Section 9-105; and
(d) injunctive relief pursuant to Section 9-108.
Section 7-104. Codes of Professional Conduct.
This Article shall not affect liability under any Code of Professional
Conduct.
Comment to Section 7-104
Section 7-104 provides that in establishing liability for breach of con-
fidence the provisions of Article 7 do not affect a person's liability under
any Code of Professional Conduct. Various professions have codes of
conduct that discipline members who disclose confidential information that
those members learn in the course of their profession. See, e.g., A.M.A.
Principles of Medical Ethics § 9 (1975); Model Code of Professional
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Responsibility Canon 4, EC 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, DR 4-401 (1980). Civil liability
for breach of confidence, as established in Section 7-101, does not preclude
additional liability for violating these or other professional codes of conduct.
Accordingly, a lawyer who makes an unprivileged disclosure of information
that his client revealed in confidence may be held liable under Section 7-




Section 8-101. Liability Premised on Republication.
(a) Liability for Republication.
(i) Unless privileged under subsection (b), a person who pub-
lishes information derived from a previous publication is
subject to liability as if the person originally published the
information, if publishing the information would create
liability under Sections 3-101, 4-101, or 5-102 of this [Act].
(ii) A person who has published information is subject to
liability for injury caused by the natural and probable
republication of that information by any person other than
the injured person, if publishing the information would
create liability under Sections 3-101, 4-101, or 5-102 of this
[Act].
(b) Privilege to Republish.
(i) Except as provided in subsection (b)(ii), a person who
republishes information derived from another person's pre-
vious publication is not liable for republishing the infor-
mation, if:
A. the republisher does not know or have reason to know
that the information would cause injury; and
B. the republisher names the source from which it derived
the information in close proximity to the information.
(ii) The privilege in subsection (b)(i) does not protect a repub-
lisher from liability if a person in the position of the
republisher could not reasonably rely on the information's
source and on the accuracy of the information from which
the republication was derived.
(c) Limitations on Liability for Third Party Republication. A person
who has published information is not liable for injury caused by a
third party republication if:
(i) the third party republication occurred after the person made
a sufficient retraction pursuant to subsection 9-111(b) or a
publication satisfying subsection 9-107(a)(i) of this [Act]; or
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(ii) the person notifies the third party that publishing the in-
formation may cause injury and the third party receives
notification before publishing the information.
Comment to Section 8-101
The three subsections of Section 8-101 are structured to establish and
circumscribe liability for republication. Subsection 8-101(a) sets forth two
bases of republication liability. Under subsection 8-101(a)(i) a person is
liable for publishing information that the person obtained from an earlier
communication. Under subsection 8-101(a)(ii), a person is liable for harm
caused by subsequent third party communications derived from the person's
communication. Subsections 8-101(b) and 8-101(c) provide for publishers
and republishers to take curative action and limit their liability for repub-
lication under subsection 8-101(a).
Section 8-101 modifies common-law rules of liability for republication
in several ways. First, subsection 8-101(a) applies the rule of liability for
republication to actions for product disparagement and communication of
intimate facts as well as actions for harm to reputation. Second, subsection
8-101(b) provides a privilege for republishing information, together with the
name of the source of the information, not provided in the common law.
Third, subsection 8-101(c) permits a publisher to limit its liability for third
party republication by making a sufficient retraction or publication pursuant
to a declaratory judgment under Section 9-107. Fourth, a republisher who
does not wish to make a retraction may avoid liability for republication by
specific third parties by informing the third parties that the published
information may cause injury. An additional limitation to liability is con-
tained in Section 8-103, which precludes any person from bringing an action
against a person for a third party republication that occurs ten years or
later after the person's publication.
In establishing republication liability subsection 8-101(a) adopts three
policies. First, the rule that a republisher is subject to liability as an original
publisher encourages care on the part of the republisher in making com-
munications that might harm another person. Second, imposing the liability
of an original publisher upon a republisher also acknowledges that repub-
lication is as likely to cause harm as the original publication. Third, by
imposing liability on a previous publisher for foreseeable third party repub-
lications, subsection 8-101(b) recognizes that an original communication may
cause harm beyond the initial publication as third parties repeat and
republish the substance of the original communication.
These policies apply as much to the harm caused by republication of
intimate facts or information disparaging a commercial product as to
information harming reputation. The rules of liability in Section 8-101,
therefore, have been extended to apply to the causes of action for com-
munication of intimate facts and product disparagement as well as for harm
to reputation. By imposing liability for republication of intimate facts,
Section 8-101 also preserves a plaintiff's remedies under the structure of
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the Model Communicative Torts Act. Under the Act emotional harm is not
compensable in an action for harm to reputation. By extending the rule of
republication liability to actions for communication of intimate facts, Section
8-101 preserves an injured person's ability to recover for emotional harm
that republication of intimate facts causes.
Subsection 8-101(a)(i) adopts the principle expressed in Section 578 of
the Restatement of Torts (Second) that a republisher adopts a statement as
his own statement. The privilege that subsection 8-101(b) provides for a
republisher who attributes information to a source, however, substantially
limits the application of the principle.
Subsection 8-101(a)(ii) adopts with modifications the principles embodied
in Section 576 of the Restatement of Torts (Second). Subsection 8-101(a)(ii)
abandons the three-part structure of Section 576 of the Restatement of
Torts (Second) in favor of a rule of liability based on reasonable foresee-
ability of republication. Section 576(c) of the Restatement (Second) essen-
tially expresses such a rule in recognizing liability for "a third person('s)
... repetition ... reasonably to be expected." The scope of "natural and
probable consequence" under subsection 8-101(a)(ii) is slightly broader than
the language of section 576(c) of the Restatement (Second). By abandoning
the reference to "repetition" in Section 576(c) of the Restatement, subsection
8-101(a)(ii) applies to conduct as well as statements. Subsection 8-101(a)(ii)
is sufficiently broad to include liability for republication that the publisher
authorized or intended. Subsection 8-101(a)(ii), therefore, includes a similar
liability standard that the Restatement (Second) recognized in Section 576(b)
by referring to "repetition authorized or intended by the original defamer"
without excluding liability for republication by conduct and republication
of conduct.
Subsection 8-101(a)(ii) abandons the rule in Section 576(a) of the Re-
statement (Second) that a publisher is liable for republication merely because
a third party republisher has a privilege to repeat injurious information.
Under subsection 8-101(a)(ii) the issue of whether a third party republication
is privileged is irrelevant to determining whether a previous publisher is
subject to liability. The rule of the Restatement (Second) rested on a policy
that the injured person should have a party against whom to bring an action
to vindicate his reputation. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 576 com-
ment b (1977). Subsection 8-101(a)(ii) rejects this policy. An injured person
has ample opportunity to vindicate his reputation without resorting to the
rule set forth in Section 576(a) of the Restatement (Second). The injured
person may vindicate his reputation in an action for the previous publication,
provided that he brings the action before the statute of limitations has run.
See § 8-103 of this Act (setting forth statute of limitations). If a republication
is a natural and probable consequence of a previous publication, the injured
person may bring an action against the previous publisher even though the
republication is privileged.
To demonstrate under Section 8-101 that republication has occurred, a
plaintiff must show that the alleged republication derived from the previous
publication. See Windsor-Lake, Inc. v. WROK, 94 Ill. App. 2d 403, 236
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N.E.2d 913, 915 (1968). Evidence that the alleged republisher and the
previous publisher both published matter concerning the same event should
not be insufficient to establish republication. See Davis v. National Broad-
casting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. La. 1970). To recover against
an initial publisher for foreseeable third party republication, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the republisher selected the information in the republication
from information contained in the previous publication.
Subsection 8-101(b)(i) provides an absolute privilege to republish infor-
mation if the republisher has no reason to know the information might
cause injury and attributes the information to its source. This exception is
a marked departure from the rule expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts that a person may not avoid liability by attributing a communication
to its source. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 comment b (1977)
(newspaper is subject to liability for statement even though newspaper named
first newspaper in which statement appeared). Subsection 8-101(b)(i) is
intended to impose liability for injury resulting from communication on the
source of information.
The scope of the privilege, however, extends only to the republisher's
liability for his own publication. The privilege does not foreclose the
republisher's liability under subsection 8-101(a)(ii) for natural and probable
republications derived from the republisher's publication. Hence, a news-
paper that attributes a quoted or paraphrased statement to its source is
protected by subsection 8-101(b)(i) for the publication but, nevertheless, is
subject to liability for injury caused when a radio broadcaster later reads
the newspaper's statement over the air. To avoid liability for third party
republication, the newspaper must take corrective action pursuant to sub-
section 8-101(c).
Subsection 8-101(b) limits the scope of the republisher's privilege in two
ways. Subsection 8-101(b)(i)(A) provides that republication is not privileged
if the republisher knew or had reason to know that the republished matter
might cause injury. Subsection 8-101(b)(ii) limits the application of the
privilege regarding the responsibility of republishers that occupy special
positions in communications media.
Under subsection 8-101(b)(i)(A) "reason to know" refers to a repub-
lisher's possession of information that would cause a person of reasonable
intelligence to infer that a republication may cause injury. See RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1977). The word "injury" in subsection 8-
101(b)(i)(A) means harm for which a person may recover damages under
Sections 3-101, 4-101, or 5-102 of the Act. A person seeking recovery against
a republisher must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the
republisher had reason to know that republication would cause injury.
If a previous publisher notified the republisher before republication
occurred that republishing information would cause injury, the republisher
would have reason to know that injury would occur and republication is
not privileged. In this way, subsection 8-101(b)(i)(A) operates with the
limitation on liability under subsection 8-101(c)(i) to permit a publisher to
shift the risk of liability for third-party republication to the third party by
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notifying the third party that the information may cause injury. The
interaction of the two subsections is intended to encourage the flow of
accurate information from prior publishers to third parties and prevent
increase of injury by unnecessary republication.
Subsection 8-101(b)(ii) provides a flexible rule for limiting the scope of
the privilege to republish information. The flexibility of subsection 8-
101(b)(ii) expands the privilege that Section 581 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts provided for persons who transmit or deliver defamatory material.
Under Section 581 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person who
sells, rents, gives, transfers, or circulates defamatory matter is not liable
unless the person knew or had reason to know that the matter was
defamatory. Section 581 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to
news dealers, bookstores, libraries, messengers, and telegraph companies.
By creating a flexible rule for limiting the scope of the privilege, subsection
8-101(b)(ii) eliminates the need to list and define the persons who may claim
the protection of the privilege.
The flexibility of subsection 8-101(b)(ii) rests on the reference to a
''person in the position of the republisher." Reasonable reliance under
subsection 8-101(b)(ii) will vary according to the position of the republisher.
Some republishers, such as publishers of books and producers of plays,
movies, or television programs, are able to create great injury through
widespread republication. These republishers have ample opportunity before
republishing to review the material to determine the potentially injurious
content. Republishers who have a practical opportunity to control the
information that they republish should bear responsibility for reviewing
material before republishing it. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 581
comment c (1977) (comparing persons who put information into market to
persons who distribute information in market).
If a review of the material to be published would reveal information
that could cause injury compensable under Sections 3-101, 4-101, or 5-102
of the Act, the republisher also may have a duty to inquire into the accuracy
of the information and the reliability of the source of the information. In
determining whether to impose a duty on the republisher to inquire into
the accuracy of information, a court should consider whether an inquiry is
practical. Time constraints may limit the ability of a republisher to inquire
into the accuracy of material that third parties have prepared. For instance,
it would be impractical for a newspaper to undertake a thorough investi-
gation into the subject matter of a story that broke shortly before going to
press. If a court-imposed duty of inquiry results, as a practical matter, in
a republisher's self-censorship of material that a third party has prepared,
the policy of encouraging editorial supervision should yield to the policy of
encouraging the free exchange of ideas and information.
Subsection 8-101(b)(ii), therefore, requires a two-step determination of
reasonable reliance. In the first step, a court should determine whether the
republisher is capable of causing great injury through widespread publication
and has the opportunity to exercise editorial supervision over the republished
material. Unless the republisher satisfies both prongs of the first step of
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the test, the republisher should be subject only to the "reason to know"
standard set forth in subsection 8-101(b)(i)(A). If the republisher satisfies
both prongs of the first step of the test, however, subsection 8-101(b)(ii)
requires that the republisher at least review the material before republishing
it.
Section 8-101(c) permits a publisher to limit liability for third party
republication by taking corrective action. Under subsection 8-101(c)(i), a
person who makes a sufficient retraction or publication pursuant to an
action for declaratory judgment is not subject to liability for any third
party republication that occurs after the retraction. Subsection 8-101(c)(ii)
provides that a publisher can avoid liability for third party republication by
giving third parties actual notice that republishing the information may
cause harm. No publisher is subject to liability for a republication that
occurs ten years or later after the person's publication.
Subsection 8-101(c)(ii) provides a means for a person to limit liability
for natural and probable republications by targeting corrective action to
third parties that the person knows have received potentially injurious
information. Subsection 8-101(c)(ii), however, provides immunity from lia-
bility for republication only to a person who has effectively notified third
parties that republication of information may cause injury. Subsection 8-
101(c)(ii), therefore, provides the most protection to a person who knows
the identity of third parties who have received information from the person.
Section 8-102 Single Publication Rule.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), each communication
to a third party is a separate publication.
(b) A communication simultaneously received by more than one third
party is a single publication.
(c) Any edition of a book or newspaper, radio or television broadcast,
exhibition of a motion picture, or other aggregate communication
is a single publication.
(d) As to any single publication:
(i) damages in all jurisdictions can be recovered in any cause
of action under this [Act];
(ii) a judgment for or against the plaintiff on the merits of any
cause of action brought under this [Act] bars any collateral
adjudication of that cause of action between the same
parties in all jurisdictions.
Section 8-103. Limitations on Actions.
(a) All claims under this [Act] shall be barred unless the action is
commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year of
the plaintiff's knowledge of the subject communication, but in no
case may an action be commenced more than five years after the
subject communication.
(b) All claims based on a republication under Section 8-101(a)(ii) shall
be barred unless the action is commenced in a court of competent
jurisdiction within ten years of the publication of the information
from which the republication was derived.
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(c) The limitations period is tolled during the period provided in Section
9-109 for a request for retraction.
Comment to Section 8-103
Section 8-103 contains two provisions addressing limitations on actions.
First, Section 8-103 balances the interests of both parties to a suit under
the Act by adopting a rule based on plaintiff's discovery of the communi-
cation, but strictly limiting the period for filing suit once discovery is made
and precluding all suits filed more than five years after the making of the
communication. Second, Section 8-103 provides a ten-year limitation period
for suits based on republication.
Subsection 8-103(a) provides that a plaintiff must commence a suit
under the Act within one year of the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the
communication. Although most states provide a one-year statute of limita-
tions on libel actions, states vary as to when they begin the limitations
period. Some states provide that a libel cause of action accrues when the
publication is made, see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 215 (McKinney 1971);
ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-201 (Smith-Hurd 1934), while other states
provide that a libel cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff learns
of the communication. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982).
Basing the statute of limitations upon the making of the communication
has the advantage of providing a definite limitation on a communicator's
liability. The Act departs from this approach in recognition of the fact that
a person can be injured by a communication of which the victim is unaware.
Subsection 8-103(a) also provides that a communicator's potential lia-
bility is terminated after the passage of five years following the making of
the communication. The five-year limitation on liability represents a balance
struck between fairness to plaintiffs and fairness to defendants. The Act
protects unaware plaintiffs, but only for five years. Accordingly, a com-
municator will not have to defend a communicative tort suit initiated more
than five years after the alleged tortious communication. The only exception
to this rule applies if a communication is republished. Republication is
addressed in subsection 8-103(b).
Subsection 8-103(b) rejects the common-law principle that republication
indefinitely can extend into the future a person's liability for publishing
injurious information. This provision ultimately protects publishers from
the distant repercussive effects of injurious publications. Together with the
privilege provided in subsection 8-101(b)(i) for republishers who attribute
information to a source, subsection 8-103(b) potentially can foreclose all
liability for republication of injurious information ten years or more after
publication. Although foreclosing liability after ten years may work a
hardship on injured persons, subsection 8-103(b) adopts a policy of pro-
tecting publishers from claims based on past actions and encourages rapid
resolution of claims.
Subsection 8-103(c) provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations
while a plaintiff awaits a defendant's reply to a request for retraction made
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
pursuant to Section 9-109. The policy behind subsection 8-103(c) is that
plaintiffs should not be discouraged from requesting retractions out of
concern that the limitations period is nearly at an end. Although Sections
9-109 and 9-111 require a defendant to respond to a request for a retraction
within twenty-five days, if the request comes within twenty-five days of the
running of the statute of limitations, a defendant should not be able to
delay answering to cause the statute to run. Although a plaintiff could file
a suit before he requests a retraction, subsection 8-103(c) allows a plaintiff
to avoid incurring the legal fees attendant on filing suit.
Section 8-104. Jurisdiction over Nondomiciliaries.
In an action arising under this [Act], a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary or over an executor or administrator,
if the defendant possesses sufficient minimum contacts with the State and
substantial injury occurred within the State.
Comment to Section 8-104
Section 8-104 provides that the enacting State's courts will exercise
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants only when the forum state
has a significant interest in the outcome of the litigation. To that extent,
Section 8-104 blends the purposes of a long-arm statute with those of a
choice of law provision.
States are not required to provide long-arm jurisdiction. At least one
state specifically exempts libel defendants from long-arm jurisdiction. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1972). With the growth of
national communication systems, however, there is an increased likelihood
that a communicative tort action will involve parties from different states,
thus requiring long-arm jurisdiction. Some state long-arm statutes allow
state courts to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the extent
the United States Constitution permits. E.F. ScoLds & P. HAY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 315 (1982). Current constitutional law requires only that an out-
of-state defendant possess "certain minimum contacts [with the forum
jurisdiction] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Although the sufficient minimum
contacts test insures that defendants are not denied due process, the test
allows parties with little or no relation to a state to use state courts to
settle disputes. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)
(allowing jurisdiction even though defendant's contacts with forum state
constituted less than one percent of its business and plaintiff's contacts with
forum state practically were nonexistent). Because of the likelihood of
multistate communications, however, more than minimum contacts is re-
quired.
Section 8-104 provides that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a case
only if the defendant possesses minimum contacts with, and substantial
injury occurred within, the enacting state. Whether a defendant possesses
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minimum contacts will be determined under the test enunciated in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Whether
substantial injury occurred within the state is a factual question properly
determined by consideration of all the circumstances. For example, if five
percent of the injury occurred within the state, but no more than five
percent of the injury occurred in any other state, the court may consider
five percent to be substantial injury. This substantial injury prong is
analogous to the significant relationship test used in the choice of law area.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 (1971). The Act simply
limits the factors a court must consider in determining whether a significant
relationship exists to the amount of injury within the state.
Section 8-105. Pleadings.
(a) In an action under this [Act], a plaintiff shall set forth in the
complaint the communication, specific challenged portions thereof,
and any relevant surrounding circumstances that give rise to the
cause of action.
(b) If the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant continuously made
the communication and is reasonably likely to continue to make
the communication, the court may, upon the plaintiff's motion,
shorten the time for defendant to answer to not less than ten days
after service of the complaint upon the defendant.
(i) Continuous communication means three or more publica-
tions within fifteen days.
(ii) If a court grants a plaintiff's motion to shorten the time
period for the defendant's answer, the court shall give
precedence in setting the case for trial and may not grant
a continuance in excess of ten days without the consent of
the adverse party.
Comment to Section 8-105
Section 8-105 provides that a plaintiff filing a complaint under the Act
must describe the subject communication in sufficient detail to inform
adequately the defendant of the subject of the suit. This Section imposes
special requirements in communicative tort actions that extend beyond the
requirements generally imposed for all pleadings under state laws. Although
some states require particularity of pleading in libel actions, see N.Y. Civ.
PRuc. L. & R. § 3016(a) (McKinney 1974), current law largely remains
silent on how particularly a cause of action for a communicative tort must
be pled. Consequently, in some states a plaintiff may append a copy of a
book or lengthy article to the complaint, forcing the defendant to deduce
what part of the publication the plaintiff finds objectionable. Particularity
of pleading makes the defendant immediately aware of the subject of the
suit, thus promoting efficiency and facilitating early steps to retract the
communication or to settle the suit.
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Subsection 8-105(a) requires that a plaintiff set out in a complaint the
exact offending words or conduct. A plaintiff may not give a general
description of the communication limited by terms such as "to the effect"
or "substantially." Furthermore, if only a portion of a communication is
actionable, the plaintiff must specify in the complaint the actionable portion.
If the ordinary meaning of the subject communication does not give
rise to a cause of action under this Act, but the circumstances surrounding
the communication imply a meaning to the communication other than the
ordinary meaning, the plaintiff must plead the specific circumstances. In a
case involving innuendo, sarcasm, or a statement accompanied by conduct,
the plaintiff must state the alleged implicit meaning.
Subsection 8-105(b) provides that a plaintiff who alleges continuous
injury from a communication that continuously is being made may have
the proceeding expedited. At least one state currently provides for expedited
proceedings. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 460.5 (West 1973). Inclusion of
subsection 8-105(b) reflects a policy decision that plaintiffs who are not
eligible for injunctions pursuant to Section 9-108, but who nonetheless are
being injured by a continuously made communication, should have an
opportunity to obtain relief earlier than normal litigation procedures provide.
Section 8-106. Reporter's Source Privilege.
(a) A court may not compel the disclosure of an unidentified source
of information obtained by a reporter during the course of the
reporter's employment. However, in an action in which a reporter
or news medium is a party defendant, a party can petition the court
to limit or prohibit the defendant's reliance on the unidentified
source.
(b) In a motion to limit or prohibit a media defendant's reliance on
an unidentified source, the moving party must demonstrate that:
(i) the information to be obtained from the unidentified source
is relevant to the cause of action;
(ii) the information cannot be obtained through alternative
means; and
(iii) the party has a compelling interest in obtaining the infor-
mation.
(c) If a court grants a motion to limit or prohibit a defendant's reliance
on an unidentified source and the defendant chooses not to reveal
the identity of the source, the court in its discretion may preclude
the defendant's introduction of evidence of the existence of the
source or instruct the jury that the defendant's failure to produce
the source creates a rebuttable presumption that the source does
not exist.
Comment to Section 8-106
Section 8-106 strikes a balance between a reporter's need to protect the
identity of confidential sources and a plaintiff's need to discover the source
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of the information. Forcing reporters to disclose the identity of confidential
sources might deter informants from providing necessary information to the
press, except anonymously. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980). The press might not publish any of the
information because of the inherent unreliability of anonymous tips. Id.
However, the press should not be allowed to hide behind a confidential
source to another party's detriment.
Subsection 8-106(a) provides that a court may not compel a reporter or
a reporter's employer to reveal the identity of a confidential source. This
"shield" is consistent with many state laws preventing courts from imposing
contempt sanctions upon reporters. See M. FRANKLiN, MASS MEDiA LAW
581 (3d ed. 1987). Subsection 8-106(a)'s shield, however, does not provide
media defendants with an absolute privilege. Upon the requisite showing, a
court may impose sanctions upon the media defendant's reliance on the
source.
Subsection 8-106(b) adopts the three-part test set out in Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980). A party seeking
a court-ordered limitation or prohibition of a media defendant's reliance
on an unidentified source essentially must demonstrate that the party's case
would be untenable without the identity of the source and that the infor-
mation is otherwise unavailable. Thus, in recognition of the importance to
the media of unidentified sources, subsection 8-106(b) erects a difficult
obstacle for moving parties. Accordingly, only in extreme cases will a media
defendant have to suffer any hardship for maintaining the confidentiality
of a source.
Subsection 8-106(c) gives courts discretion in crafting remedies for
moving parties. Although a court cannot force a reporter to disclose the
identity of the source, the court can limit a media defendant's reliance on
the source. Subsection 8-106(c) permits a court to consider the circumstances
of each case in determining the extent to which the court should limit a
media defendant's reliance on a source.
Section 8-107. Other Privileged Communications.
An action under this [Act] may not be maintained against any defendant
for a communication that is privileged. A privileged communication is one
made:
(a) with the consent of the subject of a communication, other than a
confidential communication under Section 7-101;
(b) in the course of a person's testimony under oath in a judicial or
legislative proceeding;
(c) to prevent potential harm to third persons or to preserve the public
safety; or
(d) as a fair and accurate report of a judicial or legislative proceeding.
Comment to Section 8-107
Section 8-107 contains privileges that generally are applicable under the
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Act. At common law some communications were privileged because the
speaker's status or position required the free exchange of information or
because on some occasions the freedom to speak in protection of certain
interests was more important than any potential harm to reputation. R.
SACK, LiBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 267 (1980). Section 8-107,
combined with other privileges specific to certain Articles in the Act,
supplants the common-law privileges.
Subsection 8-107(a) provides that if the subject of a communication
consents to the communication before the communication is made, the
communication is privileged. Subsection (a) does not constitute a change in
existing law. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977). Consistent with
the Restatement (Second), the requisite consent cannot be obtained through
duress or fraud or from a person who lacks the capacity to consent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 comment b (1977). A person also
may limit the scope of the consent.
A person impliedly may consent to the communication. Whether a
person impliedly consented is to be determined in light of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged consent. Implied consent exists when a person's
words or conduct reasonably could be interpreted as an expression of consent
to the publication. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 comment c
(1977).
Subsection 8-107(b) privileges all communications made while the com-
municator is testifying under oath in a judicial or legislative proceeding.
The function of witnesses is of fundamental importance to the administration
of justice and to the governing of our society. The final judgment of
tribunals or decisions by legislatures must be based on facts that witnesses
provided. To promote full disclosure, witnesses must not fear private suits
based on these communications. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588
comment a (1977).
The testimonial privilege is not a license to communicate injurious
information. Subsection 8-107(b) only privileges statements pertinent to the
proceeding. To be pertinent, a statement must appear to have enough
connection with the proceeding so that a reasonable person might think it
relevant. R. SACK, supra, at 269. Any doubts regarding the pertinence of
a statement should be resolved in the speaker's favor.
A judicial proceeding includes proceedings before any court or agency
of a court. Judicial proceedings also should include proceedings that are
judicial in character although held before another tribunal, such as an
extradition hearing before the governor of a state or an impeachment
proceeding before a legislative body. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 611 comment d (1977) (describing judicial proceedings in context of fair
and accurate report privilege). A legislative proceeding includes any pro-
ceeding before Congress, state legislatures, or municipal councils. RESTATE-
ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 comment c (1977).
Subsection 8-107(c) privileges all communications made either to prevent
potential harm to third persons or to preserve the public safety. Subsection
(c) reflects the public policy that it is desirable that true information be
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given whenever it is reasonably necessary to prevent harm to another person
or to the public in general. Existing law privileges communications that are
made to protect a third party's interest or certain interests of the public.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977). The drafters decided
that a third party's interest or the public interest was not a sufficiently
limiting standard. Therefore, the Act departs from existing law by privileging
only communications made to prevent harm to third parties or to preserve
the public safety.
Subsection 8-107(d) allows a person to report information obtained at
an open judicial or legislative proceeding. The rationale for this privilege is
that information about the content of official proceedings should be made
available to the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 comment a
(1977). To promote the public interest, subsection 8-107(d) permits a person
to report on an open judicial or legislative proceeding as long as the report
is fair and true.
For the privilege in subsection 8-107(d) to apply, the proceeding must
be open to the public. Therefore, the privilege is designed to permit the
press to be the public's proxy at proceedings that the public could attend.
Accordingly, if the public could not attend a proceeding, the subsection (d)
privilege will not protect a report of the closed proceeding. Furthermore,
subsection (d) does not privilege the communication of material contained
in records of closed proceedings.
To be a true report, the report must be a substantially correct account
of the proceeding. Minor inaccuracies in the report should not preclude the
communicator from asserting the subsection (d) privilege. To be a fair
report, the communication must not be misleading. To qualify for the
privilege, the report need not be a verbatim account of a proceeding.
However, nothing in the report must "be omitted or misplaced in such a
manner as to convey an erroneous impression to those who hear or read
it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 comment f (1977).
Section 8-108. Severability.
If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
or applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] are
severable.
Section 8-109. Burden of Proof.
Unless otherwise provided in this [Act], the burden of proof shall be
by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Article 9
Remedies
Section 9-101. Special Damages.
In any action arising under this [Act] in which a party may recover
special damages, recovery shall be limited to reasonable compensation based
on proof of lost earnings, diminished earning capacity, lost profits, loss of
commercial value, or any other pecuniary loss that proximately results from
the injury.
Comment to Section 9-101
Section 9-101 provides the measure of special damages recoverable under
the Act but limits the recovery to certain types of provable economic injury.
The requirement of proof of actual injury and the limitation of damages
to those that are pecuniary will reduce the chilling effect on free speech
that results from presumed damages. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (linking damages to "pall of fear and timidity" on
part of press); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)
(limiting damages to compensation for actual injury in private plaintiff
cases where actual malice is not required to prove liability). Additionally,
an across-the-board special damages rule reduces the complexity in com-
municative torts by eliminating distinctions between classes of plaintiffs and
defendants. Emotional harm is not included in special damages because
injury to personal feelings should not be compensated in many classes of
communicative torts. Cf. Gertz, supra (including emotional harm in actual
injury).
The requirement of proof of actual injury places recovery for commu-
nicative torts on an equal footing with recovery in other tort cases. See
Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
747 (1984). Compensation, therefore, is limited to proven injury rather than
the open-ended general and presumed injury for which damages could be
recovered at common law. For example, a party recovering for injury to
reputation may recover only for the economic damage caused by harm to
reputation.
Excluding emotional harm from actual injury departs from current law.
This exclusion will prevent plaintiffs from recovering for emotional harm
when they cannot prove injury to reputation. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 461 (1976) (allowing recovery for emotional harm even though
plaintiff failed to prove reputational harm). The policy justification for this
change is that a plaintiff whose reputation is injured will be able to show
some form of economic injury. See Anderson, supra (arguing that truly
injured plaintiff can show harm to reputation).
The requirement of proof of actual injury will provide reviewing courts
with a record against which to assess damage awards. Under the Act courts
reviewing awards that compensate for actual injury will be able to determine
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when the evidence supports the award. Previously, courts reviewing pre-
sumed damage awards had little or no check on the size of the award
because the plaintiff did not have to offer any evidence of injury.
Section 9-101 also is intended to permit a plaintiff to recover for future
injury. If the injury to the protected interest will continue, the damage
award may compensate for proven future loss and not merely for damages
that exist at the time of the action.
Section 9-102. Emotional Harm.
In any action arising under this [Act] in which a party may recover
damages resulting from emotional harm, recovery shall be limited to:
(a) reasonable compensation for emotional harm, based on proof of
mental anguish and suffering, personal humiliation, or emotional
distress; and
(b) reasonable compensation based on proof of physical pain and
suffering proximately resulting from the emotional harm.
Comment to Section 9-102
Section 9-102 recognizes that certain limited classes of communicative
torts result in emotional injury. Emotional injury includes personal humil-
iation and mental anguish and suffering. Section 9-102 also recognizes that
an emotional injury may manifest itself in the form of physical pain and
suffering. The Act allows recovery for both types of injury.
In many cases a party may be able to offer evidence in addition to the
party's testimony that will prove the existence of emotional injury. This
Section, however, does not require that a party present any "independent"
evidence of the injury. For example, a plaintiff who offers his own testi-
mony, which the jury finds credible, that he or she suffered emotional
harm may recover under Section 9-102.
Recovery for emotional injury is not allowed for persons who are not
the subject of a communication even though they also may suffer emotional
harm as the result of a communication. This prohibition eliminates a source
of large potential liability to unforeseen plaintiffs and limits a publisher's
liability to those who are the subject of a communication. An owner,
officer, or employee of a business entity that is the subject of a commu-
nicative tort may not recover for emotional injuries.
Section 9-103. Physical Injuries.
In any action arising under this [Act] in which a party may recover
damages resulting from physical injury, recovery may include, in addition
to special damages under Section 9-101, reasonable compensation for pain
and suffering proximately resulting from the physical injury.
Comment to Section 9-103
Section 9-103 governs recovery for physical injuries. While damages for
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physical injuries can be recovered under Section 9-101, Section 9-103 pro-
vides for additional recovery by permitting recovery for pain and suffering
proximately resulting from physical injury. Thus, a party who may recover
for physical injuries may recover the types of economic damages available
under Section 9-101 and damages for pain and suffering under Section 9-
103. A party claiming pain and suffering bears the burden of proving that
the pain and suffering proximately resulted from a physical injury.
Section 9-104. Property Damage.
In any action arising under this [Act] in which a party may recover for
damages to real or personal property, recovery shall be limited to the
difference between the fair market value of the property prior to the
occurrence giving rise to liability and the fair market value of the property
immediately after the occurrence.
Comment to Section 9-104
Section 9-104 governs recovery for damage to real and personal property,
limiting recovery to the difference between the fair market value of the
property before and after the injury. "Fair market value" refers to the
selling price of similar property established by expert testimony and generally
accepted valuation techniques. Economic damage flowing from the property
damage, such as lost profits due to damaged equipment, is not recoverable
under this Section. However, economic damages of this type are available
under Section 9-101.
Section 9-105. Punitive Damages.
Punitive damages shall be allowed only as explicitly authorized by this
[Act], and shall be available only to a party who has proven damages under
Sections 9-101, 9-102, 9-103, or 9-104.
Comment to Section 9-105
Section 9-105 governs punitive damages that are available in limited
cases under the Act. The policy rationale for the punitive damages limitation
is that punitive damages have a severe chilling effect on free speech. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Additionally, as a practical
matter juries already may add a punitive element in awarding compensatory
damages. See Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 747 (1984).
The Act eliminates punitive damages for communicative torts except in
specified classes of cases, such as intentional misrepresentation, noncom-
mercial fraud, and breach of confidentiality. In all instances, punitive
damages are available only if the plaintiff establishes a specified level of
fault and successfully recovers some other form of damages as a precon-
dition.
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A plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages unless the plaintiff has
suffered some harm as a result of the communicative tort. The requirement
that a party recover some other damage award before recovering punitive
damages prevents a jury from awarding nominal damages and using the
nominal damages as a basis for awarding punitive damages. This requirement
is a change from common-law libel. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882
(2d Cir. 1976) (awarding punitive damages because defendant knowingly
published false facts even though plaintiff did not prove actual damages).
This requirement will prevent a plaintiff who has not been injured from
recovering a large award that could chill free speech. For a plaintiff
interested only in nominal damages, the declaratory judgment provisions of
the Act should suffice.
Section 9-106. Attorneys' Fees.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or in Sections 9-107 and 9-
109, a party shall not recover attorneys' fees.
(b) If in any action under this [Act], the court determines that a party
vexatiously prolonged the litigation or maintained frivolous claims,
the court may award the opposing party reasonable attorneys' fees
and court costs.
Comment to Section 9-106
Section 9-106 adopts the American rule that a party bears his or her
own attorneys' fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Three exceptions serve to encourage the rapid
disposition of communicative tort cases. The first, provided in subsection
9-107(b)(ii), encourages plaintiffs to seek a nondamage remedy when a non-
damage remedy will protect their interests by awarding attorneys' fees and
costs to a prevailing plaintiff. The second, provided in subsection 9-109(c)(ii),
encourages plaintiffs to seek a retraction or opportunity to reply by re-
warding such an effort with attorneys' fees when the effort is unsuccessful
and the plaintiff ultimately prevails in an action arising under this Act.
This exception also encourages defendants to retract or allow a reply by
penalizing a failure to do so if the defendant ultimately loses on the merits.
The third exception to the general rule is found in subsection 9-106(b),
which authorizes an award of attorneys' fees against a party who maintains
vexatious or frivolous actions. This exception discourages tactics that un-
fairly prolong litigation and add to the expense of the opposing party. Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (providing for sanctions of attorneys' fees when
an attorney unreasonably and vexatiously prolongs litigation); FED. R. Civ.
P. 11. In appropriate cases courts may apply this sanction to a party's
attorney in addition to or instead of sanctioning the party. See Note, When
Is An Attorney Unreasonable and Vexatious?, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
249 (1988) (discussing appropriateness of sanctioning attorneys).
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Section 9-107. Declaratory Judgment.
A party bringing an action under Sections 3-101 or 5-102 of this [Act]
may elect to seek a declaratory judgment that a communication contained
injurious or disparaging false or misleading statements.
(a) If in an action seeking a declaratory judgment the trier of fact
determines that a communication contained false or misleading
statements:
(i) the court shall order that the party who made the com-
munication publish or cause to be published in a manner
and medium reasonably calculated to reach the same audi-
ence as the false or misleading communication, the contents
of the declaratory judgment or a correction satisfactory to
the plaintiff; and
(ii) the party obtaining the declaratory judgment shall recover
reasonable attorneys' fees and reasonable costs of bringing
the action.
(b) Actions for declaratory judgments shall be granted docket priority
and, absent consent of the parties, shall be adjudicated in a court
or in a court-annexed proceeding not more than 120 days after the
filing of the complaint, unless the court makes a finding on the
record that such an expedited trial is impracticable under the cir-
cumstances.
(c) Damages shall not be recoverable in a declaratory judgment action.
Comment to Section 9-107
Section 9-107 permits a plaintiff to require that an action be tried as a
declaratory judgment action with no damages permitted. The declaratory
judgment alternative provides plaintiffs with an expedited and less costly
alternative by which to vindicate the interests harmed by a communicative
tort. See LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM,
PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW 16 (1988) (discussing advantages
of declaratory judgment action); BEZANSON, SOLOSKI AND CRANBERG, LIBEL
LAW AND THE PRESS, 172-77 (1987). Both plaintiffs and defendants will
benefit from the reduced costs incident to a declaratory judgment action as
opposed to the costs associated with an action for damages. Additionally,
a declaratory judgment eliminates the possibility of large damage awards
that may chill free speech. The speed and efficiency of a declaratory
judgment action and the award of attorneys' fees and costs offset the
plaintiff's loss of an opportunity to recover money damages. The require-
ment of an expedited trial also benefits defendants because the possible
award of attorneys' fees and costs will be less. Because discovery is limited
to the issue of whether the statements were false or misleading, both
plaintiffs and defendants will incur lower costs than in an action for damages
unless the defendant chooses to rebut the presumption of injury.
The issues to be litigated in a declaratory judgment action are whether
the communication was false or misleading and caused the relevant injury.
A court should disallow discovery into or presentation of evidence concern-
ing matters relevant only to fault. Attempted discovery into these matters
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could lead to a sanction of attorneys' fees under Section 9-106 if the party
attempting such discovery does so to prolong the litigation or harass the
opposing party.
Under subsection 9-107(a)(i) a court will not make the choice between
requiring publication of the contents of the declaratory judgment or a
correction satisfactory to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff agrees to the defen-
dant's proposed correction, the defendant simply will publish the correction.
If the plaintiff does not agree to the proposed correction, the defendant
must publish the contents of the declaratory judgment. This prevents plain-
tiffs from requiring publication of a correction that the defendant does not
think should be published. The defendant can refuse to offer a correction
and publish the contents of the declaratory judgment.
A court may order that the declaratory judgment action be heard by a
court-annexed adjudicatory body such as a magistrate, referee, or master.
This is designed to allow a declaratory judgment action to be heard quickly,
even in jurisdictions that have a backlog of civil actions. A court that orders
a court-annexed adjudication should incorporate the decision of the adju-
dicator into an order of the court. The adjudicator's decision is subject to
de novo review by that court.
Once a party has filed an action for declaratory judgment, the party
may not file an action for damages based on the same claim. This require-
ment, however, will not prevent a party from bringing an action based on
republication of a tortious communication. See ACT § 8-101.
Section 9-108. Injunctive Relief.
(a) A party may seek injunctive relief only as explicitly authorized by
this [Act].
(b) A court may grant injunctive relief preventing the making of all or
a part of a communication only if after an adversary hearing the
court finds that:
(i) the party seeking the injunction has shown that irreparable
harm will result to the party in the absence of the injunctive
relief and that the injunction will prevent the harm; and
(ii) the injunctive relief is narrowly tailored and is the least
restrictive means of preventing the irreparable harm.
(c) A court may grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction only if the party seeking the injunction has instituted an
action seeking permanent injunctive relief and is likely to succeed
at trial.
(d) In any action in which temporary or preliminary injunctive relief
has been granted, the court may require the posting of a bond and
shall try the action within 60 days after the issuance of the temporary
or preliminary injunctive relief.
Comment to Section 9-108
Section 9-108 governs actions under Sections 3-101, 4-102, 5-101, or 7-
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103 for injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury or to prevent the
repetition of a communication that a court has determined to be tortious.
The rationale for allowing injunctive relief is that damages may not ade-
quately compensate a party after publication has occurred. Historically,
courts disfavor prior restraints. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931). Courts, however, have allowed injunctions restraining publication
to protect specific business and commercial interests such as trademark or
copyright infringement. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Reddy Communications, Inc.
v. Environmental Action Fund, 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1977); Karam-
chandani v. Ground Technology, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). Additionally, a narrowly tailored prior restraint may withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny if the interest protected by the injunction "outweighs"
the first amendment interest in protecting free speech. Near, 283 U.S. at
716. Rather than adopting a blanket prohibition against "prior restraints,"
Section 9-108 recognizes that an "adjudication" of a violation of this Act
may precede publication and, therefore, allows the issuance of injunctions
in appropriate cases.
Section 9-108 specifies the constitutional procedural safeguards required
before a court may issue an injunction restraining publication: (a) the party
seeking the injunction has the burden of instituting judicial proceedings that
will result in a final judicial determination of whether the communication
violates this Act; (b) a court may issue an injunction only after an adversary
hearing; and (c) a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. See
Abrams, Prior Restraint, 1986 COMUNmICATIONs LAW 395, 462-68.
Within this procedural framework, injunctions are permitted only in
very limited situations. Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary
remedy that will be inappropriate in most cases. Permanent injunctive relief
will be an appropriate remedy in cases where a party has proven that the
communication was wrongful and continuous use or publication of the
communication will cause continued injury. An injunction in these cases,
however, must be tailored narrowly to protect the party.
The findings that Section 9-108 requires courts to make before issuing
an injunction must follow an adversary hearing where the opposing parties
have a chance to present the merits of their respective cases. Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). The
requirement of irreparable harm adopts the traditional standard applied to
the issuance of injunctive relief. The court must find that any other remedy
provided under this Act will not adequately compensate the party for the
injury that allegedly will result from the communication.
The requirement that a party seeking temporary injunctive relief show
a likelihood of success on the merits requires not only that the party make
out a prima facie case, but that the party be able to carry the appropriate
burden of proof at trial. Additionally, the party seeking the injunction must
overcome the defendant's prima facie case showing that the defendant has
a defense permitted under this Act.
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Section 9-109. Retraction.
Subject to subsection (c), a party may elect to forego any other remedy
provided under this [Act] and request that the person making a communi-
cation publish a retraction or provide an opportunity to reply.
(a) The request for a retraction or reply must be made in writing and
signed by the party or by the party's authorized agent. The request
must specify the statements claimed to be false or misleading and
the basis for that claim.
(b) (i) If the party who made the communication timely publishes
a sufficient retraction or reply, the party requesting the
retraction or reply shall be forever barred from obtaining
any other relief applicable to the claim.
(ii) A timely and sufficient retraction fulfills the requirements
of this Section in all cases. An opportunity to reply does
not fulfill the requirements of this Section if a retraction is
specifically requested.
(c) If the person making the communication refuses to publish a
retraction or reply:
(i) the party requesting the retraction or reply shall be entitled
to pursue any remedy provided under the other provisions
of this [Act];
(ii) the party requesting the retraction or reply, if awarded any
damages under this [Act], shall recover reasonable attorneys'
fees; and
(iii) in determining whether the statute of limitations has expired,
the time between the date on which a party receives a
request for retraction or an opportunity to reply and the
expiration of the time provided under Section 9-111 for the
publication of a retraction or a reply shall not be considered.
Comment to Section 9-109
The retraction Sections (9-109 through 9-111) should be read as a whole.
These Sections represent a careful balancing of the interests of plaintiffs
and defendants and are designed to encourage the prompt, informal settle-
ment of tort claims arising out of communication.
Section 9-109 permits a party suing under Articles 3 or 5 of the Act to
seek a retraction or an opportunity to reply rather than damages or a
declaratory judgment. A retraction or reply is a simple and efficient remedy.
Additionally, a retraction or reply serves to limit or eliminate the damages
caused by a communication. Unlike many current retraction statutes, Section
9-109 does not require a party to seek a retraction or opportunity to reply
before filing an action for damages or a declaratory judgment. Cf. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99-1 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West 1983). The
rationale for this change is that a retraction may not effectively make the
party whole and, therefore, the party should not be required to seek a
retraction or reply. A party may seek a retraction or opportunity to reply
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at any time prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations provided
for actions arising under this Act.
Section 9-109 is designed to encourage parties to grant a request for
retraction or reply by providing that the requesting party may seek no
additional remedy in the event of the publication of a retraction or reply.
Additionally, by refusing the request, a party is subject to a possible award
of attorneys' fees if the requesting party thereafter prevails in an action for
damages.
Under Section 9-109 the requesting party may choose between a retrac-
tion or an opportunity to reply. The opposing party, however, may not
fulfill the requirements of this Section by offering to publish a reply when
the requesting party has requested a retraction. A retraction, however,
always will fulfill the requirements of this Section.
Section 9-110. Publisher's Offer of Retraction.
(a) If within 10 days of a communication, the person who makes the
communication publishes or causes to be published a sufficient
retraction, the person may assert the retraction as a complete defense
to liability under Sections 3-101 and 5-102.
(b) If a person who makes a communication that is the subject of an
action under Sections 3-101 or 5-102 publishes or causes to be
published a sufficient retraction at any time prior to the beginning
of trial, the person shall be liable only for those damages occurring
prior to the publication of the retraction.
Comment to Section 9-110
Under Section 9-110 a publisher may retract unilaterally within ten days
of a communication and avoid any liability. Section 9-110 is an important
and unique provision of this Act. Section 9-110 is designed to encourage
publishers to correct mistakes quickly and thereby avoid much of the harm
that may flow from publication. Subsection 9-110(b) also allows a publisher
voluntarily to retract at a later point and thereby cut off any future liability,
except in the case where a republication precedes the retraction. At a trial
of an action in which the defendant has published a retraction in accordance
with subsection 9-110(b), the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving
damages that occurred prior to the publication.
Section 9-111. Timely and Sufficient Retraction or Opportunity to Reply.
(a) To be timely, a retraction or reply must be published within 25
days of receipt of the request.
(b) To be sufficient:
(i) the retraction or reply must be published in a manner and
medium reasonably calculated to reach the same audience
as the false or misleading communication; and
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(ii) in the case of a retraction, must set forth the errors or
misleading statements contained in the original communi-
cation and must contain a correction and repudiation of
the false or misleading statements.
Comment to Section 9-111
Section 9-111 sets out the requirements for a timely and sufficient
retraction or opportunity for reply. A "timely" retraction must be published
within 25 days of a request for retraction. A "sufficient" retraction or
reply must be published in substantially the same manner and medium as
the original communication unless publication in some other manner and
medium reasonably is calculated to reach the same audience as the original
communication.
A "sufficient" retraction also must withdraw and repudiate the original
communication. An equivocal retraction will not satisfy the requirements
of this Section. If the party requesting a retraction claims that the alleged
communicative tort was the result of an implication contained in a com-
munication, a sufficient retraction need contain only a statement that the
party making the communication did not intend the implication and that
the party rejects the implication. This will allow the publisher to disavow
the alleged implication and yet stand behind the "facts" of the story.
In the case of a reply, the party publishing the reply reasonably may
require that the reply not exceed the space or length of the original
communication unless to do so would not permit the replying party to
address adequately the dispute.
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